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ABSTRACT
A description of the Capital Markets as a source of shipping finance is
presented. The reason why shipowners have not widely accepted Stock
Exchanges as fund raising sources for their projects is also presented. The
main areas of concern, major problems and future potential of this type of
financing were discussed. The determining factors which shape the
shipowners' and investors' attitude towards shipping stocks and bonds were
also assessed, as major shipping finance restructuring depends directly on
them. The profiles of already listed shipping companies were studied and
conclusions were drawn about the characteristics which make the shares of
such companies attractive. These conclusions were substantiated by
developing an econometric model based on regression analysis, whose
purpose was to identify these very characteristics necessary for good stock
price performance. Moreover, the model was useful in finding how sensitive
stock prices are to changes in these characteristics as well as changes in
shipping market conditions. Finally, all of the above concepts and
conclusions, as they apply to US and Oslo listed shipping companies, were
combined with the legal framework and current economic conditions of the
Athens Stock Exchange in order to study the feasibility of a merchant
shipping company listing on this Exchange.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Shipping finance has received great attention over the last few years as
it is a well accepted fact that some four hundred billion dollars are required to
meet the shipping industry needsl, most of which will be used toward
building between three thousand and four thousand ships2 by the end of this
century. However, it seems that the traditional methods of financing
shipping, i.e. bank loans and owners' funds, will not be enough for the large
scale renewal that is needed. The large losses which banks incurred during
the eighties, coupled with the new capital adequacy rules, create a need for
alternative ways of financing shipping. Such an alternate method of
financing is by raising equity and/or debt through the capital markets.
It is the goal of this work to discuss and support the feasibility of this
method in applying it to the shipping industry. Here it should be recognized
that other shipping financing methods, such as leasing and mezzanine
financing have also become attractive alternatives to typical bank term loans,
at least temporarily. Moreover, the importance of shipbuilding subsidies has
also increased mostly due to the new Chapter XI Regulations. These
Regulations have again made it possible for U.S. shipyards to build and repair
vessels for foreign country shipping companies after thirty five years.
However, these methods will not be addressed here since they produce a
small fraction of possible funds compared to the capital markets.
Several shipping companies have been successful in raising capital in
the stock exchange, but it has to be noted that the choice of exchange is very
important since different exchanges have very different characteristics when
1 Lloyds List, Tuesday, August 24, 1993, "Shipping needs $400 BN to avert 'unprecedented
crisis"'.
2 Strengthening America's Shipyards. A Plan For Competing In The International Market,
U.S. Presidential Commission, October 1, 1993.
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it pertains to shipping stocks. For example, the New York Stock Exchange is
relatively active in the shipping sector, whereas in the London Stock
Exchange this sector has been absorbed by the transportation sector. On the
other hand the Oslo Stock Exchange is very active in this sector due to tax
advantages which allowed shipowners to incorporate their companies in
Norway, although this is not an incentive anymore. Regarding the Athens
Stock Exchange (ASE), many merchant shipping companies have considered
for a long time to incorporate their companies in Greece. In 1994, a passenger
shipping company, STRINZIS lines, was allowed for the first time to enter the
ASE. The successful listing of this passenger shipping company paved the way
for possible merchant shipping company incorporations in the future.
Even though coastal shipping is very different than merchant
shipping, some similarities between those two sectors do exist, a more
elaborate discussion of which will be in part of Section 8.3. An analysis of the
performance of some already listed merchant shipping companies worldwide
and the determinants of their shipping price performance will be studied
using an econometric model. The investor's view is also going to be a major
part of this work since it is the investor who will ultimately determine
whether a listing is successful or not.
Since this work concentrates on Greek shipowners3, a discussion of
what characterizes the way Greeks do business transactions will be necessary
in order to understand what characteristics are important for Greeks that may
be irrelevant for business in other parts of the world. The opinion presented
in this work was formed partly from the author's personal involvement with
Greek business and mainly by various interviews conducted with members of
the Greek banking and shipping community, various brokerage firm
representatives, investment consultants and people who in one way or
another influence or have a valid opinion on the subject of shipping finance
and the stockmarket.
3 Throughout this thesis, Greek shipowners are defined as any shipowners whose nationality is
Greek regardless of where their office base is and where their ships are registered.
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Moreover, in this work, the debt offering market for shipping firms
will be evaluated and this type of financing will be compared to the
traditional term loans which banks have been offering for years.
The main goal of this work is to enable any reader who is involved
with the shipping industry to understand the role of the capital markets for
this industry, assess the need and future of this market as well as point out
and discuss the main areas of concern. It will also assess the possibility and
feasibility of a merchant shipping company listing in the ASE by trying to
answer the following questions:
- How have the shipping companies which are already listed in the U.S. and
Oslo Stock Exchange performed so far and why?
- Was their good or bad performance mostly due to macroeconomic,
microeconomic, or market reasons? What were these reasons and how could
their poor performance have been avoided?
- What are the characteristics which are important for the stock prices of those
companies and would they be as important if these companies were listed in
the ASE?
- What type of investors invest in shipping companies and to what extend do
they invest? What do they find attractive (or not) in such stocks?
- What can the companies do to attract more investors?
- Are currency exchange and interest rate issues a major drawback for
shipping companies entering the ASE?
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Chapter 2
Historical Overview
Before World War II, private equity and retained earnings were the
major source of shipping finance and debt levels were around twenty to
twenty five percent of shipping projects. Due to the needs of the industry and
the growth in demand for shipping services, the period between the sixties
and early seventies saw a large increase in debt financing. As a result of bank
competition, several banks became excessively exposed to the shipping sector,
stretching the usual sixty percent financial limit at times to more than one
hundred percent in order to cover working capital requirements and vessel
acquisitions. Today traditional banking sources of shipping capital have been
restricted due to the following reasons:
The shipping market collapse in 1973 which resulted because of the
sharp reduction of oil production by OPEC countries was disastrous for both
banks and owners. The substantially lower freight rates that followed that
crisis led to the inability of many shipowners to pay their debts Nevertheless,
the crisis was not fully appreciated by bankers who kept providing good deals
with soft terms. Inevitably, another shipping market collapse came in the
eighties for various reasons, one of which was the oversupply of vessels that
was due mainly from the plethora of bank loans. During 1983 many banks
withdrew from the shipping industry and those which remained either
changed their credit policies, if they had any, or created new ones that were
stringent enough in order to avoid further losses.
* The new Capital Adequacy Rules imposed on banks by the Bank of
International Settlements in Switzerland in January 1993, led many banks to
be more selective with their loans. According to these rules, the banks' capital
base must reach a minimum of eight percent of risk weighted assets. As a
result, shipping loans which represent higher risk loans, have been reduced
by greater client selectivity and stricter loan terms and conditions. Now the
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returns from shipping have to be compared with those of other sectors of the
bank.
However, bank profits that relate to shipping activities can still be
substantial and are not only in the form of interest rates, i.e., margins on
LIBOR 4 and management fees, but also from charges on activities, such as
foreign exchange transactions, money transfers, commission on letters of
guarantee, and letters of guarantee. Table 2.1 shows the average gross profits
of four international financial institutions from various operations related to
shipping except from advisory services and underwriting of issues. This table
clearly shows that there is a shift from interest earning to ancillary service
earnings.
Table 2.1
Average Gross Income of Four International Banks
Even though it seems that banks are not willing to finance a large
percentage of vessel acquisitions, the owners themselves do not want to have
the large gearing they used to have; therefore, some owners suggest that even
if their banks were willing to finance more than sixty percent of their projects,
they would not agree to such terms. Nevertheless, these are the cash rich
shipowners who have no problem finding the rest of the financing. However,
it is unclear how the rest of the owners will finance their fleet replacement
needs.
4 LIBOR, the London Interbank Offered Rate, is used by banks as a base for the interest rate
they will impose on their loans. There exist corresponding interbank rates in other European
countries but LIBOR has been traditionally used for Shipping Loans all over the world.
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YEAR 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Interest 60% 58% 57% 55% 54% 52%
Foreign Exchange 19% 21% 23% 23% 23% 25%
Commission* 21% 21% 20% 22% 23% 23%
*Charges on Transfers, Letters of Credits, Letters of Guarantees and others
Percentages out of total of Interest, Foreign Exchange and Commission Income
Compilation: International Center for Shipping, Trade & Finance, City University Business School,
London, 1993
There have been many discussions and attempts by Greek shipowners
to tap the capital markets but the only fruitful attempts were those of the
Angelicousis Group with Anangel-American Shipholdings, the listing of
Global Ocean Carriers by the Tsakos Group and the Maritime Investment
Fund also by the Tsakos Group. Moreover, Eletson Corporation was
successful in raising one hundred and forty million dollars through a ten year
Yankee bond s. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show a number of equity private placements
and public offerings by shipping companies supporting the fact that more and
more shipping companies have considered equity placements as a new
financing method. In particular, Table 2.2 gives some more information
about the most recent of these stock offerings and also includes some
unsuccessful offerings. In addition, Table 2.4 lists various high yield bond
offerings and the terms of the loans associated with them, and shows that
bond offerings are also becoming increasingly important in shipping finance.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the worldwide shipping debt and equity offerings
from 1984 to 1993 in millions of dollars. It is interesting to note that the main
reason for the big success of debt offering in 1993 was the low interest rates
that prevailed during that period
5A Yankee Bond is a bond issued in the US by a non-US issuer.
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Table 2.2 Stock Offering Particulars
OFFERING PARTICULARS
Issue Company Offer Amount* Stock Underwriters/
Date Price Market Sponsors
Jun. 87 Anangel-
American
Shipholdings
Sept. 87 B+H Bulk
Carriers
$10
$10
$ 89m
$ 20m
Lux. American Express Bank
Shearson Lehman
NASDAQ Mabon, Nugent & Co.
Sept. 87 First Olsen
Tankers
Jul. 88 Hellespot
Tankers
$.25m** $ 47m
$.25m** $ 30m
private Citicorp Investment
private Chase Manhattan Bank
Drexel Burnham Lambert
Aug. 88 B+H Ocean
Carriers
Dec. 88 Global Ocean
Carriers
Feb. 89 B+H Maritime
Carriers
May. 89 Nortankers
May. 89 MC Shipping
Jun. 89 Red Sea Tanker
Fund
Jun. 89 Anangel-
American
Shipholdings
Aug. 89 Bay Ocean A
Carriers
$10
$15
$15
$15
$15
$.25m**
$ 16.5
$15 E
$ 60m
$ 45m
$ 45m
$ 79m
$ 45m
$ 42m
$ 107m
$ 50m
AMEX Merill Lynch C.M.
Furman Selz M.D. & B.
Mabon, Nugent & Co.
AMEX Merill Lynch C.M.
Blunt, Ellis & Lowei
AMEX Salomon Brothers Inc.
Mabon, Nugent & Co.
AMEX Smith Barney, H.U. & Co.
Mabon, Nugent & Co.
AMEX Salomon Brothers Inc.
private Chase Manhattan Bank
Nat. Commercial Bank
Lux-ADS; Shearson Lehman Hutton
NASDAQ Furman Selz M.D. & B.
Mabon, Nugent & Co.
AMEX Donaldson L. & Jenrette
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Table 2.2 Stock Offering Particulars continued
OFFERING PARTICULARS
Issue Company Offer Amount* Stock Underwriters/
Date Price Market Sponsors
Oct. 89 Jason A $15 E
Overseas
Nov. 89 B+H Crude A
Carriers
Dec. 93 Maritime Inv.
Fund Limited
93 First Olsen
Tankers Ltd.
Mar. 94 Viking Star A
Shipping Inc.
$15 E
$10
N/A
$ 17 E
Apr. 93 Astro Tankers A $14 E
Limited
$ 75m
$ 60m
$ 45m
N/A
$ 240m
$ 70m
AMEX Smith Barney, H.U. & Co.
Mabon Nugent International
AMEX Salomon Brothers Inc.
Prudential-Bache C..
Oslo Nomura International plc
DnB Fonds AS
Oslo Fearnley
Fonds A/S
NYSE Morgan Stanley & Co.
Goldman, Sachs & Co.
Smith Barney Shearson Inc.
NASDAQ Lehman Brothers
Furman Selz Inc.
Apr. 94 Strinzis
Lines S.A.
Drs. 1,250 Drs. 453.8m ASE Barcleys Bank PLC
Commercial Bank
Citibank, Employment Bank
E.T.E.B.A., Hios Bank
E.T.B.A., Ionian Bank
Euro Invest. Bank
* Includes promoters' equity participation
A: Aborted
E: Estimated
** The stocks were sold privately in "chunks" of .25m dollars
Source: Grammenos,. and Deere, "International and US Initial Public Offerings and private
Placements of Equity for Shipping Investments, from 1987-1989", City University Business School,
1992.
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Table 2.3 Publicly quoted shipping companies in 1994
Publicly Quoted Shipping Related Companies by Principal Market
Trading in September 1994
MARKET COMPANY
A/S Ganger Rolf
A/S Hav
Actinor Shipping
Awilco A/S
Belship Co. Ltd. Skibs-A/S
Benor Tankers
Bergensen Dy A/S
Bona Shipholdings Ltd
Bonheur
Borgestad
Far Shipping
Hafslund Nycomed
IM Skaugen
Kvaerner a/s
Leif Hegh & Co
Mosvold Shipping
Nomadic Shipping A/S
Norwegian American Lines
Smedvig A/S
Stolt Comex Seaway
Stolt Partners S.A.
Storli A/S
Vard A/S
Western Bulk Carriers
Wlh. Wilhelmsen
Maritime investment Fund
CMB
MARKET COMPANY
United
States
Alexander & Baldwin
American President Cos
Anangel-American
B+H Maritime Carriers Ltd.
B+H Ocean
BT Shipping
Carnival Cruise
Chiles Offshore
CSX Corporation
Global Ocean Carriers
International Shipholding
Corporation
Kirby Corporation
Maritrans LP
MC Shipping
OMI Corp.
Overseas Shipholding Group
PLM international Inc.
Reading & Bates Corp.
Rowan
Royal Caribbean Cruises
Sea Containers Ltd.
Seacor
Stolt-Nielsen
Tidewater Inc.
Todd Shipyards Corp.
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Norway
Belgium
__ __________
- --- - -
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Table 2.3 Continued
MARKET COMPANY
Netherlands Nedloyd
Van Ommeren Transport
& Terminals
United Lasmo plc
Kingdom London & Overseas
Freighters PLC
P&O
Canada Algoma Central Marine
Viking Star
Denmark Burmeister & Wain A/S
BurWain Tankers
D/S 1912
D/S Motortramp
D/S Norden
D/S Orient
D/S Svendborg
D/S Torm
DFDS A/S
East Asiatic Co. Ltd. A/S
J.Lauritzen Group
Finland Birka Line AB
Eff John Oy Ab
Germany Bremer Vulkan
Hapag Lloyd
Greece Dane Lines
Strinzis Lines
Hong Kong IMC Holdings
Orient Overseas Ltd.
Wah Kwong Shipping Ltd.
.MARKEIT COMPANY
Sweden Argonaut
Bilspedition
Bylock & Nordsjofrakt
Concordia Maritime AB
Frontline
ICB Shipping
Nordstrom & Thulin
Reteri AB Gotland
Stena AB Group
Stena line
United Tankers
Wallenius Lines
Japan K. Line
Kawasaki Heavy Industries
Mitsui OSK
NYK Line
Sumimoto Heavy Industries
Malaysia MISC
Mexico TMM
Thailand Jutha Maritime
Republic Evergreen Marine Group
of China
Singapore Far Eastern Levingston
Hai Sun Hup
Keppel Corporation
Nepture Orient Lines
Pacific Carriers
Sembawang Shipyard Ltd.
Straits steamship Land
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Table 2.4 Bond Offering Particulars
BOND OFFERINGS
17
Company OMI Corporation Eletson holdings Transp. Maritima Transp. Maritima
Mexicana Mexicana
Issue Date 10/27/93 11/19/93 10/7/93 5/5/93
Issue 10.25% 9.25% 8.50%o 9.25%
Senior Notes Mtg Notes Senior Notes Senior Notes
Ask 100 100.5 100.5 101.5
Size $170MM $140MM $150MM $150MM
Maturity 11/1/03 11/15/03 10/15/00 5/15/03
Rating B1/B Ba2/BB Ba2/BB- Ba2/BB-
Sinking Fund None None None None
Call Date 11/1/98 11/15/03 NC-L 5/15/98
Call Price 105.125 104.625 N/A 104.625
YTFC 11.11% 9.91% N/A 9.72%
YTM 10.25% 9.17% 8.40% 9%/o
Underwriter Goldman Sachs, Citicorp Bear Steams, Chase, Bear Steams,
Citicorp Securities, Citicorp Goldman Sachs
Table 2.4 Continued
Company International Viking Star Overseas Overseas
Shipholding (Teekay) Shipholding Group Shipholding Group
Issue Date 7/1/93 7/8/93 9/29/93 N/A
Issue 9%0 9.63% 8.75% 8%/0
Senior Notes Mtg Notes Senior Debts Senior Notes
Ask 100 N/A 102.5 101.5
Size $100MM $175MM $100MM N/A
Maturity 7/1/03 7/15/03 12/1/13 12/1/03
Rating B1/BB- Ba3/B+ Bal/BBB- Bal/BBB-
Sinking Fund None $25MM None None
Call Date 7/9/93 7/15/98 Make-Whole Make-Whole
Call Price 103.375 104.813 N/A N/A
YTFC 9.64% N/A N/A N/A
YTM 9%0 N/A 8.48% 7.77%
Underwriter N/A N/A Goldman Sachs & Co., Chase Securities Inc
Chase Securities, Inc., J.P. Morgan
Citicorp
Source: Morgan Stanley
Source: Articles and Company financial reports
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Figure 2.1 Worldwide Shipping Debt
Worldwide Shipping Debt Offerings
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Figure 2.2 Worldwide Shipping Equity Offerings
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Chapter 3
Theory behind Private Placements
and Public Offerings
When shipowners consider raising additional funds in the capital
markets through either a debt or equity offering, they can choose between a
private placement or a public offering. A private placement is a private sale of
unregistered equity or/and debt securities to a relatively limited number of
private or institutional investors. A public offering is a more regulated form
of private placement and is the securitization of debt or/and equity which
will be available publicly in one or more stock exchanges. The companies
trying to raise the capital could be listed already in a stock exchange or are
about to be listed.
Debt offerings have been limited in relation to their equity
counterparts even though there was a surge of those issues during 1993
because of the low interest rates prevailing in the U.S. during that period.
Shipping equity offerings come mainly in two forms. One is the form of an
already established shipping company which wants to raise equity through
the capital by either issuing new shares or selling the existing shares of the
current owners to the public. The other form is a separate newly established
shipping entity usually referred to as a shipping fund, which is financed
through the fundraising initiated by the promoters. Such funds are typically
used for speculative gains primarily from increase in asset value and are
mostly in the form of private placements. But the tendency lately shifts
toward the former type of offerings because the experience so far has shown
that this type of approach is better suited for any offering. This will be
discussed in great detail in Chapter 4.
Finally, there are some advantages and disadvantages to both equity
and debt placements and between private placements and public offerings.
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The next section will attempt to discuss the pros and cons of these issues and
try to determine what kind of company is suited for any or both of these
fundraising instruments and what makes an equity preferable to a debt
offering for a particular company.
22
3.1 Bond Offerings
As discussed previously, debt offerings from shipping companies seem
to be a good alternative to bank term loans. But as the following discussion
will show, the companies which would most probably succeed on a debt
placement are those that could get the best terms on a bank loan.
There are three main groups that can benefit (or lose) from a debt
placement. These are the existing shareholders, the investors i.e. the bond
holders, and to a lesser extent the financial institutions including banks,
investment banks, brokerage firms and other firms involved in the
transaction either implicitly or explicitly. What follows is first a comparison
of debt offerings to equity offerings and term loans as these affect the
company's existing shareholders. Then the most important advantages and
disadvantages of debt offerings are presented to both investors and financial
institutions.
23
a) The Company's Existing
Shareholders
Advantages Over Equity
* One major advantage of debt over equity offerings is the retention of
control that could be lost if an equity placement which involves the majority
of shares takes place.
* In contrast to a public offering of securities, in a private placement of
debt there is no requirement to file with the Securities and Exchange
Commission any detailed financial information regarding the operation of
the shipping company which is about to be listed, although for accounting
purposes financials must be prepared in conformity with U.S. GAAP.
Moreover, detailed financial information has to be disclosed to the
investment bankers involved in the transaction and the purchasers of the
privately placed debt, but the widespread dissemination of the issuer's
financial information is avoided.
* In a debt offering, there is a known Cash Flow outlay in contrast to an
equity offering where dividend payouts are not and cannot be strictly planned
ahead.
· The transactional costs in the form of investment banking fees and
expenses are usually lower in the case of a debt placement than in an equity
placement. In fact, in some private debt placements, especially those of
smaller size, no underwriting fees are paid. This is due to the fact that the
risks involved in placing a debt of a privately held company in which there
is no initial market are so high that no underwriter desires to take them. In
such a case, the borrower bears the risk of placing the debt and the
underwriters act merely as agents. This does not mean that preparing a
memorandum for a private placement is not costly. Such a memorandum
can rise to a level of detail that may be similar to that of a public offering
prospectus, especially with a 144A type of placement. This is a very particular
24
type of placement to be discussed latter. Nevertheless, transaction costs
overall are less for a debt offering than for a stock offering.
In the US where there are tax exemptions on profit or loss of debt
interest, it is assumed that debt is a better solution for the owners than equity.
However, because usually low or no taxes are paid by shipping companies in
general, this advantage might not be relevant in the shipping industry.
Particularly in Greece, according to Public Law 2065/92, which applies only to
the shipping industry, shareholders are free of any tax burdens.
Disadvantages Over Equity
The limited number of purchasers available in a bond offering is a
major disadvantage for bond offerings. Due to the typically low credit ratings
of shipping companies, some potential lenders particularly in the U.S., may
be prohibited by law to purchase such debt. U.S. pension funds for example
are one of them. Moreover, according to Federal Reserve Bank statistics, forty
percent of the debt placed in the U.S. market in 1991 was held by five
insurance companies6 and seventy percent of all privately placed debt was
held by twenty insurance companies But not all twenty of these institutions
do purchase shipping debt because U.S. state regulations allow only a certain
portion of speculative investments to be included in insurance companies'
portfolios. In particular, in June, 1990, the U.S. National Association of
Insurance Commissioners made the rules which deal with the credit quality
of the investments of insurance companies stricter7. Consequently, a BB rated
bond, which was considered investment grade when purchased in 1990 is, as
of January 1, 1994, considered a speculative investment. However, this applies
only to the U.S. insurance companies and there remains a fairly large market
abroad that might be interested in shipping bonds.
678 Federal Reserve Bulletin, February, 1993, pg. 80.
7 Id at pg. 85
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Advantages over Term Loans
* Both debt placement transaction and overall costs are less than
standard bank debt financing costs. The typical one-vessel corporation bank
financing with a preferred mortgage, assignment of earnings and insurance,
along with parent or cross-guarantees, all of which are repeated over
multiple transactions, can produce significant transactional costs. In contrast,
the cost of debt placement in the U.S. is usually less. The two main
exceptions are the public registrations with the U.S. Securities of Exchange
Commission of debt placements in excess of US $5,000,000 which are of
Section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1993, as amended and Rule 506. For such
offerings the overall costs may turn out to be higher than bank loan costs.
But as the amount of funds to be raised increases, debt placements have a
transactional cost advantage over traditional bank debt finance.
* On the other hand it appears that, at least some of the recent debt
placements carry a financial cost well in excess of standard bank financing8
and that the principal factor driving the transaction may simply be access to a
level of debt financing not attainable from banks. So the greater maturity of
the debt placements which is not offered by bank loans and which may
coincide with the wide shipping investment horizon explains why the
financial costs may be higher.
* The flexibility of a debt placement compared to that of a term loan can
generally be seen as another advantage of public debt. The ability to tailor a
placement to the needs of the issuer, for example, bullet payment provisions
which are quite uncommon in bank debt, provides an advantage over bank
loans. Also advantages over bank loans are the existence of subordinated debt
as well as the ad hoc basis of debt offerings according to the relevant market
conditions and the issuer's needs. But on the other hand we could argue that
problematic bank loans are easier to restructure than debt placements. The
impersonal structure of bonds, as opposed to the closer lender-borrower
relationship of tailor-made term loans eliminates the prospect of work-outs
8 Mark M. Jaffe, Debt Placements, the pros and cons for shipping companies, Proceedings of the
6th International Ship Finance Conference, 1993
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in debt servicing difficulties. Bond issuing may also prove to be more
inflexible due to wider commitment and maturity and the bullet payment
may turn out to be an excessive burden. Whether the ability of tailoring a
debt placement to the needs of the issuer outweighs the advantage of being
able to restructure a problematic bank loan is company specific and depends
on various company as well as shipping market factors. It is however
perceived that the downside risk of not having the ability to restructure a
problematic bond loan is too high for many shipowners to even consider
issuing corporate bonds.
* Another reason why debt offering is superior to term loans is that the
amounts that can be raised through bond issues are much greater than
through term loans when there is no syndication involved as it was briefly
mentioned earlier.
* The publicity and prestige that come along with a bond offering are also
incentives to prefer it over term loans. Few could argue that Eletson
corporation did not gain from the publicity of its offering.
Disadvantages over Term Loans
* Although it was mentioned earlier that there is some flexibility in the
structuring of a debt placement, there are some restrictions imposed on the
borrower by the market. For example, insurance companies, which pose a
substantial market for debt offerings, typically seek to match the duration of
their investments to the duration of their liabilities. Since these liabilities are
typically long range, a shipping company not interested in issuing debt with
long term maturities might not find debt placements better than bank term
loans.
Other restrictive terms of debt placements are the substantial
repayment penalties in order to discourage re-negotiation as was discussed
earlier. This is in sharp contrast to the flexibility and low repayment penalties
usually associated with bank debt.
27
Finally the restrictive financial covenants in a private placement are
another drawback for the issuer. The ability to adjust covenants in debt
placements and to allow an issuer to ride out a storm is far different than in
the case of traditional bank financing.
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b) Investors (Bondholders)
Advantages and Disadvantages
* Holding bonds is less risky than holding stocks of a company since the
company has an obligation to pay interest and principal to bond holders
whereas it has no legal obligation to pay dividends or achieve capital gains for
its stockholders.
* Since 1990, when the U.S. government fostered the creation of a
secondary market in privately placed debt by the promulgation of Rule 144A,
private debt placements of this type gained another advantage over the highly
illiquid resale market for shipping bank loans. In particular, under Rule 144A,
securities not registered under Section 5 of the U.S. Securities Act of 1993, as
amended, may be resold or offered for sale to a "qualified institutional buyer"
or to a purchaser that the seller reasonably believes is acting on behalf of a
"qualified institutional buyer"9. As a result, some debt offerings that have not
been through all the trouble of preparing financial statements and disclosing
information that a public disclosure entails, could be sold to "qualified
institutional buyers" who are considered to be institutions sophisticated
enough not to need the vast public disclosure required by the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Such buyers are any insurance company, investment
company or employee benefit plan that "in the aggregate owns and invests on
a discretionary basis at least US$100,000,000 in securities of issuers that are not
affiliated with the entity"'0.
An added feature of the liquidity of this market has been the
development of the automated "Private Offerings, Resale and Trading
through Automated Linkages (PORTAL) Market". PORTAL is an automated
system similar to the U.S. NASDAQ trading system and provides its users
917 U.S. Code of Federal Regulations Section 230.144(d)(4)(i)(1992)
1017 U.S. Code of Federal Regulations Section 230.144A(a)(1)(i)(1992)
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with computer terminal access to this market. It also creates a secondary
market by matching buyers and sellers of debt.
Another pending legislation before the U.S. Congress entitled Financial
Asset Securitization Investment Trusts Bill ("FASIT"), could also be
significant in increasing the liquidity of shipping debt. This bill would allow
the establishment of investment trusts holding a bundle of privately placed
debt that could be sold off to the U.S. public. Such asset-backed securities
would further foster liquidity in the debt placement market since the package
of debt placements backing the securities would represent a variety of
shipping companies in a variety of sectors, thus minimizing the default of
any one issuer.
* The information shortage on the merchant shipping industry is a
problem for any potential bondholder in that industry. Unfortunately, in
contrast to cruise and container shipping which are closely analyzed by Wall
Street and other Stock Markets, bulk trading companies are part of an
idiosyncratic industry unfavorable to outsiders. When such companies
become borrowers, often referred to as "information problematic
borrowers" 11, they impose an excess burden to lenders who have to make
their own credit evaluations which possess an extra cost to the borrower. For
certain borrowers the information shortage is such that it all but forecloses
access to the investment banks and financial institutions in the debt market.
· Given the fact that because of the nature of the shipping industry debt
offerings typically have low rating, there is a risk of insolvency for this type of
offerings. The recollection of the U.S. junk bond market is a warning for both
lenders and borrowers of this market.
* The lack of anonymity and confidentiality and its effects on the
exposure of a corporate group is another disadvantage for any potential
institutional investor. The grouping of companies necessary to structure a
debt placement and the disclosure required in particular when this is a rule
144A placement puts these companies in danger of a catastrophic loss. In such
1178 Federal Reserve Bulletin, February 1993, "Recent Developments in the Market for
Privately Placed Debt", pgs. 77-92, pg. 79.
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a case, claimants and tax authorities can easily find all the information they
need about those companies to destroy them completely.
* An advantage of shipping bond offerings over other transportation
industry offerings is the existence of an International Law of the Seas, which
provides for a legal route for solving disputes both on a national and
international level whereas for example there is no such law for the Airline
industry. As a result, if a legal issue becomes a reason for a misunderstanding
between investors and promoters, it might be resolved because of the
existence of the International Law of the Seas. However, the International
Law of the Seas is not always enforceable, but still, it can still be used to
resolve disputes of issues related to shipping.
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c) Bankers, Investment Banks and
other Parties Involved
Advantages and Disadvantages
* It could be surmised that for bankers, debt offerings pose a form of
"competition" since they are an alternative to bank loans. However, debt
offerings are usually the preferred way to go when it is impossible to secure
good bank term loan deals. As a result, bond offerings cannot really be
considered a disadvantage to bankers.
· As it was mentioned earlier, the new Capital Adequacy Rules
endangered the jobs of those involved in shipping bank loans. However,
bond offerings provide an advantage both to the specially trained personnel,
who are less at risk of being used inefficiently or being laid off as well as to the
banks which can profit from the fees associated with such bond structurings.
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c) Concluding Remarks on Bond
Offerings
So far some very important issues have been addressed but have also
led to some interesting questions. Will debt placements play an important
role in financing shipping in the future or is the new generation of
shipowners going to stick to the traditional banking loans? Even though it
seems that no significant contribution to shipping finance will come from
bond offerings, the answer lies with the willingness of the new generation of
shipowners to restructure their shipping interests in such a way so that debt
offerings will be easier to place. The extent to which shipping debt can be
securitized to a broad spectrum of investors will also play an important role
in answering this question.
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3.2) Equity Placements
a) The Company's Existing
Shareholders
Advantages
* The main advantage of equity over debt placements is the reduction of
financial risk which can be substantial in such placements. In a stock offering
the issuers have no obligation to the shareholders whereas they are required
to pay bondholders both interest and principal. However, the drawback is that
in case the investment's rate of return is greater than expected, part of the
gains have to be distributed to the stockholders. In the case of bond offerings,
abnormal gains don't have to be shared with the lenders. Moreover, capital
gains, i.e. the increase in value of the shares because of the company's good
performance, do not have to be shared with bondholders either.
* If it is assumed that economies of scale exist within a shipping
company, the increased profitability that comes both from the funds raised
through an equity offering and from the additional bank debt that can be
generated due to the reduction in gearing, is an advantage of equity
placements. However, some shipowners may argue that there are no
increasing returns to scale for shipping companies after some point. Their
argument is based on the relationship between number of vessels and net
earnings. An attempt is made in Chapter 7 to quantify this view based on a
model that determines whether the number of vessels owned has any effect
on the performance of the company's shipping stock price. The results of the
model suggest that there is a positive relation between the stock prices of
shipping stocks and the number of vessels owned by a company.
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* As in the case of debt placements, a successful private or public stock
offering, will increase the prestige, reputation and market coverage of the
issuing company due to the global presence and corporate expansion potential
of most shipping related stock exchanges. Nevertheless, an unsuccessful
listing could have negative consequences both for the issuer and the stock
market handling the listing. Greek stockbrokers and bankers believe that an
unsuccessful stock listing of a merchant shipping company in the Athens
Stock Exchange (ASE) could lead to the collapse of the whole ASE since it is
currently too small to handle investments like those required by merchant
shipping companies.
* Shares offered as incentives to employees, is another advantage of
stock offerings since this action may improve the performance of the
company.
* "Playing with other people's money" is another advantage of existing
stockholders because first it enables them to expand their business without
tapping into their private funds and second to enjoy some of the profits from
this investment. It should be addressed here that typically, the existing
stockholders of a shipping company are also the managers of that company.
As a result, when the former want to raise funds for a project they have in
mind, they take advantage of those funds to invest and gain from their ideas
through management fees and the ability to invest in a project otherwise not
feasible because of the lack of funds.
Disadvantages
* The loss of control that could result by a stock offering is a major
disadvantage for the original shareholders. The issuing firm becomes more
closely observed and its management starts receiving influences from the
new shareholders. Given the nature of the shipping industry where the
decisions are often based on instinct and experience rather than on analytical
calculations, problems may arise and bad decisions may be taken because of
the influence of the new shareholders on management. On the other hand, if
management is let completely free to act as it wishes, it may act on its own
best interest rather than on the shareholders best interest which sometimes
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do not coincide. In fact, this disadvantage has been the main reason why most
shipowners have avoided the stock market so far, in particular, Greek
shipowners who are known for the closed family nature of their business.
* The loss of privacy that follows when a shipping company goes public
is another major disadvantage that has restricted companies from doing so
for so many years. The listing disclosure requirements needed by most Stock
Exchanges of the world but in particular those posed by the U.S. Security of
Exchange Commission, limit the appeal of stock offerings. However, the
view that shipping companies should become more corporate and publicly
accessible is shared by many. Sooner or latter the new generation of
shipowners will have to realize that it is no longer possible to conduct
business without preparing detailed financial statements. The increased
awareness for the environment and the continuously increasing safety issues
are reasons why shipowners should also disclose more than they used to in
order to make people trust their vessels for their transportation needs.
* High underwriting costs, management and advisory fees, sales and
legal fees as well as paper work and road show costs is another area where
equity placements have a disadvantage over bond offerings or term loans.
Also the time needed by the managers for road shows and information
distributing is substantial and was mentioned as a problem by some
shipowners whose companies are already listed in a stock exchange.
Moreover, it can be very costly to satisfy sponsors and underwriters because of
the increased risk of such a venture.
* A tax disadvantage, at least in the U.S., is also another problem of an
equity placement compared to a debt placement. In fact, equity dividends are
not tax allowable for the company owners as opposed to debt interest.
Nevertheless, the importance of the tax issue on this matter depends on the
dividend policy of the company. If no dividends are paid and all investors'
profits are realized as capital gains, tax considerations are unimportant.
Moreover, depending on the country and the laws of a particular stock
exchange the tax allowance on debt interest might not be a disadvantage for
equity placements. In Greece for example, where shipping companies are
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practically tax exempt, there is no tax advantage to a company if it issues
bonds instead of stocks
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b) Equity Investors
Advantages and Disadvantages
* The potential profitability of shipping equity stocks is the main reason
why any investor would be interested in such an investment. However,
looking at the severe cyclicality of the shipping industry, the investor hopes
for an extreme profit rather than an extreme loss when he/she considers
acquiring shipping stocks. Therefore, the same argument can be used as a
prime risk if the timing of the shipping stock purchase is bad and the offering
turns out to be unsuccessful.
* Equity offerings enable shipping stock investors to have access to an
otherwise closely held and difficult to enter industry. They also provide an
opportunity for small, unsophisticated individual investors to enter this
industry regardless of their financial background. This is an important issue
in countries such as Greece and Norway, where the shipping industry is not
only a major part of the country's economy, but of its culture as well.
* The lack of information about the shipping industry is a disadvantage
to investors in shipping stocks Unfortunately, in contrast to cruise and
container shipping which are closely analyzed by Wall Street and other Stock
Markets, bulk trading companies are part of an idiosyncratic industry
unfavorable to outsiders. As it was also pointed out in the discussion on debt
offerings, such companies may impose an excess burden on stockholders who
have to make their own credit evaluations at an extra cost.
* The low liquidity of shipping shares is another disadvantage to
investors. Unfortunately, given the structure of the shipping industry and
looking at the performance of already public shipping companies, it seems
that the resale market of shipping stocks is very restricted because of the lack
of investors interested in that kind of stocks. As a result even publicly traded
stock investors have to incur the risk of not being able to sell their stock when
they want to because of the lack of buyers.
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* The existence of an International Law of the Seas suggests that there is
a global legal framework for this industry. Even though this Law is not
always enforceable, it is possible that such underlying legal support combined
with a single currency for all shipping transactions, the dollar, could lead to
the creation of an international shipping stockmarket.
· In Greece, where banks are allowed to own brokerage firms, investors
should take into consideration the fact that there might be what is referred to
as the "inside" information problem since the brokerage firm owned by the
bank may have access to information that other brokerage firms, shareholders
and the public cannot obtain before that information becomes publicly
available. In the U.S. this is illegal and underwriting is done only by large
investment banks which cannot act as commercial banks.
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c) Bankers, Investment Banks and
other Parties Involved
Advantages and Disadvantages
* Banks and bankers already involved in shipping may gain from equity
offerings as follows. First of all, because of the reduction of gearing brought by
equity offerings, banks will have the option to lend more to their existing
customers if the latter went public, without needing to spend time and
money to analyze the companies of potential new customers. Moreover, the
publicly available information resulting from public offerings can also be
used also by bankers at no extra cost. Also, banks not previously involved
with shipping, can enter this industry more easily if they want to, due to the
availability of this information. The surge of new German and Norwegian
banks in the port of Pireas in Greece is facilitated by the fact that shipping has
entered the capital markets.
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Chapter 4
Startup Projects versus Perpetual
Companies
As discussed in the beginning of this work, there are two ways to raise
money through the capital markets. The traditional way up to 1987 was to
enter the market as a perpetual shipping company in order to list or expand
the existing businesses. However, since then a new investment vehicle was
designed because it was thought that it could facilitate outside investment in
the shipping industry. This is the Limited Life Shipping Fund type of
company, which is set up for the purchase of shipping assets via a network of
single-shipowing subsidiaries.
Since 1987, there have been many companies of this type listed in the
equity markets. These issues were both private placements and public
offerings, information for the latter being more readily available. Table 4.1
lists some of the companies of this type that are listed since 1987 together with
various information about those listings.
There are various reasons why this instrument was "invented", which
become clear upon examination of the similarities of all those placements.
First of all, most of these companies experience tax efficiencies which allow its
investors to pay negligible taxes on earnings. This is achieved by these
companies incorporating in offshore locations, as a result they have a tax
advantage over their "onshore" shipowner competitors.
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Table 4.1 START UP COMPANIES 1987-PRESENT
Issue Company Offer Amount* Stock
Date Price Market
Anangel-American
B+H Bulk Carriers
First Olsen Tankers
Hellespot Tankers
B+H Ocean Carriers
Global Ocean Carriers
KFH Olsen Tankers A
B+H Maritime Carriers
Nortankers
MC Shipping
Red Sea Tanker Fund
Anangel-American
Bay Ocean Carriers A
Jason Overseas A
B+H Crude Carriers A
BT Shipping
Astro Tankers Limited A
Maritime Inv. Fund Ltd.
$10
$10
$.25m
$.25m
$10
$15
N/A
$15
$15
$15
$.25m
$ 16.5m
$15 E
$15 E
$15 E
$10
$14 E
$10
$ 89m
$ 20m
$ 47m
$ 30m
$ 60m
$ 45m
$30m
$45m
$ 79m
$ 45m
$ 42m
$ 107m
$ 50m
$ 75m
$ 60m
$55m
$ 70m
$ 45m
Lux.
NASDAQ
private placement
private placement
AMEX
AMEX
private placement
AMEX
AMEX
AMEX
private placement
Lux-ADS;
AMEX
AMEX
AMEX
private/NASDAQ
NASDAQ
Oslo
* Includes promoters' equity participation
A: Aborted
E: Estimated
The most important similarity of all those funds was their limited life
expectancy since they all included in their prospectus the following clause
The management would liquidate the company and distribute all proceeds to
shareholders within five to seven years from the company's inception, unless
the shareholders voted otherwise. There are various explanations why such a
trend persisted.
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Jun. 87
Sept. 87
Sept. 87
Jul. 88
Aug. 88
Dec. 88
N/A
Feb. 89
May. 89
May. 89
Jun. 89
Jun. 89
Aug. 89
Oct. 89
Nov. 89
Apr. 89
Apr. 93
Dec. 93
These companies were constructed for asset players who aimed at
short-term profit rather that part-ownership of a shipping company with
long-term profit goals. For this type of investor the timing of the issue and of
the purchase of the assets is the crucial factor. Investors in this case will
expect to see the purchase of secondhand vessels that stand a good chance of
appreciation and will not necessarily expect high liquidity or steady income in
terms of dividends. This is also why most managers of such funds purchased
aged tonnage which would not be worth more than scrap after five to seven
years anyway, making the investment liquid by itself, compensating for the
expected illiquidity of the resale market for those stocks. Besides, most of
these companies had a policy of not allowing funds to be reinvested but to be
paid out as dividends, making steady dividend payout ratios impossible to
begin with.
An exception to this "rule" was Anangel-American which had a policy
of not buying vessels of more than seven years of age and was allowed to
reinvest up to two-thirds of its net income. Maybe this is the reason why the
investors decided with a dissolution vote in the final quarter of 1992 not to
liquidate the company, but to let it go on as a perpetual company. And
looking at the performance of Anangel-American compared to the other
similar "funds", it might be suggested that it has performed better than any
one of them by far. A possible explanation for this might be its policy of not
buying aged vessels and allowing for reinvestment. Moreover, the Astro
tankers fund which was attempted by the same company, but included very
old tankers, did not succeed even though it was also offered by the
Angelicousis group.
We could, however, argue that there were more problems associated
with this offering besides the old age of the vessels. One of them was that the
Angelicousis group does not have a history of managing tankers. Another
problem was the bad conditions of the stock market for any IPO at that time.
Finally, other major factors which contributed to the failure of this offering
were the more restrictive regulations imposed on tankers and the great
uncertainty at that time of the tanker industry.
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But why was this "limited life" type of fund a necessary ingredient for
these companies? What made the provision of liquidating the company after
five to seven years so important? For the private placements the answer is
that this provision gave a clearly-defined exit for investors for their illiquid
investment. But for the public offerings, where the stock market gives an
instantaneous means of exit, this is not such a valid answer. However, the
fact that there is heavy discounting of asset values in shipping stocks could be
a reason why such limited life funds were issued in the public markets.
There also exist many differences between these funds which, if
examined carefully, could provide present investors with important clues for
evaluating present opportunities. These differences could also indicate to
shipowners what they should avoid and how they should proceed if they
want to tap the capital markets.
The most important difference was whether these companies were
placed privately or publicly. The trend was that the issuers that had no major
equity resources turned to the public markets whereas the majority of well-
established and cash rich owners went to the private placement markets. The
most probable reason for this trend is related to the fact that typical private
placement investors require and expect some equity participation by the
management team. Since this type of investors consist of high net worth
individuals, in order for shipowners to be able to invest in these funds they
have to be high net worth individual also. Besides, since it is cheaper in terms
of fees and other costs to have a private placement rather than a public
offering there is no major reason why a well established shipowner would
not prefer such a placement while at the same time avoiding the higher level
of disclosure required for a public offering. However, Mr. Kanellakis, the
president of Anangel-American, stated that if a company wants to succeed in
the stock market it should do it "through the front door", i.e., fulfill all the
requirements needed for a public offering. The good performance of Anangel-
American suggests that it might be wise to take his advice.
Another difference among these funds is apparent in Table 4.2 which
shows the management's original stake in some of these companies. It is clear
that Anangel-American was the only company that had a substantial equity
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participation which may be another reason why it has done so much better
compared to the other publicly traded start-up companies. However, the main
reason for the 100% contribution of "B" type shares was that according to the
Greek law a shipping company had to be at least fifty percent owned by Greek
nationals if it's vessels were to fly the Greek flag. Therefore Anangel was
"forced" to buy those shares if it wanted its vessels to fly the Greek flag. But,
since the change of the law in 1994, the Angelicousis group decided it would
trade these shares in the public equity markets. It is not known yet how
investors will react to this action, but the result will serve as an indication on
how important the owner's equity participation is in a public offering.
In the case of privately placed funds, Fred Olsen contributed U.S.$15
million of the U.S.$50 million equity in first Olsen and U.S.$5 million of the
U.S.$25 million KFH Olsen. Papachristidis contributed 25% of both the
U.S.$24 million raised by Hellespot Tankers and the U.S.$40 million
contributed to Red sea, while Goulandris underwrote U.S.$10 million of the
U.S.$100 million raised for International Tankers Limited.
Another important difference is the composition of the board of
directors of these companies, some of them having board representation by
the investment bank that had undertaken the original placement or by some
retired shipping bankers while others being run exclusively by the promoters.
Although all of those companies had conservative debt policies, these
policies varied from 65% gearing in the most aggressive cases to zero. Also
there were differences in the quality of the vessels acquired which became
apparent latter in time, when investors realized the importance of good
maintenance of assets for a shipping company.
An attempt will be now made to try and answer such questions as what
was the contribution of bankers to this trend, was the phenomenon a success
or a failure, are we going to see more of this type of offerings in the future and
if yes, how different will they be from the companies already listed?
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Table 4.2
INSIDE OWNERSHIP OF PUBLIC STARTUP SHIPPING COMPANIES
COMPANY % ownership comments
inangel-American
'A" shares
AMEX
ASGL
"'B" Shares
ASGL
B+H Bulk Carriers
[nsiders
B+H Maritime
Insiders
B+H Ocean
Insiders
BT Shipping
Furman Selz
Leehman
Insiders
Global Ocean Carriers
Insiders
MC Shipping
Insiders
Other '"V" Group Companies
18%
0%
100% Greek law
2%
0%
11.50% Contributed as profit
on transfer of vessel
10%
0%
1%
2.50%
1%
unklown "V" refers to companies that help in
the management of the fund
7% Contributed as profit
on transfer of vessel
Source: Bloomberg Database
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Nortankers
Insiders
Since companies with this structure achieved encouraging earnings
during their first few years due to the upturn of the shipping cycle at that
time, this structure was perceived to be successful by both shipowners and
investment bankers. However, the latter, not having the experience of
shipowners on the severity of the cyclicality of the shipping industry were
more enthusiastic about this vehicle than shipowners. As a result, they
became the ones urging shipowners to use this type of 'back door" for raising
funds through the equity markets. And since without an underwriter
shipowners are unable to use capital markets, they went ahead and continued
the trend. But looking at the result of such offerings since 1990 it may be
better now to bring perpetual life shipping companies straight to the market
instead of starting up new limited life companies. Examples are the offerings
of Smedvig, Western Bulk, First Olsen and L.O.F. Also start up shipping
companies like the Tsakos' Maritime Investment Fund have a trend to
eliminate this limited life provision. As discussed earlier, the Astro tanker
offering which included that provision was a failure.
From the shipowners point of view, these companies have produced
positive results since they were able to find a source of finance during a time
when banks were not so generous with their offerings. These funds allowed
them to reduce their gearing and to expand further. Even though issuing
costs were perceived to be very high, most of them were incurred by the
outside investors and when promoters were required to buy equity, they
generally acquired the shares without paying the selling commissions that
other investors were required to pay.
As with some publicly traded companies, the management does not
always act on the shareholders best interest. There are ways through which
managers could benefit at the investor's expense. The provisions for the
protection of investors by such actions are difficult to implement and the lack
of requirements which could help to avoid such practices is a main reason
why merchant shipping companies are not allowed to enter the Athens Stock
Exchange yet. Following are some examples of structures that might benefit
managers but harm investors:
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The contracting of the technical management of the vessels to a
company owned by the promoters is beneficial to the promoters but not
necessarily to the outside investors, because they incur a technical
management fee. However, it is hard for an outside investor to prove the
opposite; therefore, a solution to this problem has not been found yet.
Another way the management could "cheat" is if it decides to operate
its vessels in a pool and the pool management company is being partially
owned by the promoters. The incurred monthly commercial management fee
and the standard chartering commission upon each fixture are "revenues" for
the promoters only but costs to other shareholders. These two issues are
another reason why significant equity participation by the owners is so
important to outside investors since such participation would reduce the size
of such actions. And when we are dealing with a private placement, where
financial information is not disclosed as in a public company, such
participation is indispensable. We could argue that the solution to this
problem might lie in the incentives given to the managers if they succeed in
making profits above a certain level. Moreover, suitable auditing could also
reduce the possibility of "cheating" by the management. However, this will
not be covered here in further detail in this work.
In order to make suggestions from the investor's point of view
whether this phenomenon was a success or a failure, a distinction must be
made between two types of shipping stock investors. The speculative
investors who are looking for short-term profits and the "dedicated"
investors who buy shipping stocks in order to participate in the shipping cycle
"game" and intend to hold the stock until the company is liquidated.
For the latter type of investor, share price performance with the
exception of Anangel-American, has been mostly disastrous. Even though,
the shipping market is partially responsible for this poor performance, it is
not the sole cause. Table 4.3 computes the Internal Rate of Return that an
original investor, having received all the company's dividends, would have
if he sold his shares in December of 1993. As seen from this table the only
investors that would have made profits under this scenario would be the
Anangel-American and the first B+H investors.
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Dividend yields on the other hand have been substantial in some cases
as Table 4.4 suggests. But by looking back at Table 4.3, one can realize that the
prices of most stocks went so low that the final results were mostly capital
losses for the original stockholders. However, Table 4.3 also indicates that
positive returns could have been generated by speculative investors had they
found buyers for their shares at the right time. This suggests that the liquidity
of a quotation is of paramount importance for a shipping stock investor and
as it was mentioned earlier, it is one of the reasons why "limited life funds"
were "invented". Again with the exception of Anangel-American, most
companies had a very low turnover and could be termed as essentially
illiquid.
Does all this mean that this phenomenon was a failure? The answer
depends on how the word "failure" is defined. As seen from the previous
discussion, from the investor's point of view this general trend was a failure
except in the two cases mentioned above. However, from the promoters'
point of view, the answer depends on their equity participation. Those with
high equity participation shared the losses together with the rest of the
investors and some of them were burdened with some lawsuits. For those
who did not have a high stake in the equity, did not have high monetary
losses but their "goodwill" was certainly affected significantly.
It is the author's opinion that start-up shipping companies still have a
future in the stock market as long as the mistakes pointed out in this work
are avoided and serve as a lesson to both promoters of funds and investors.
Furthermore, it seems that the trend is towards perpetual companies rather
than limited life companies, at least for the public market. In particular, the
success story of Anangel-American should serve well both promoters and
investors who consider new start-up shipping ventures.
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Table 4.3 SUCCESS OF INVESTMENT
COMPANY I.R.R. % I.R.R. %* Comments
annualized annualized
Dec. 1993 Peak
Anangel-American
Luxembourg investor 16.6 39.7
NASDAQ investor 6.7 8
B+H Bulk Carriers 13.9 47.5
B+H Maritime LOSS 36.7 Sale after 3 mos at 9.0% I.R.R.
B+H Ocean LOSS 42.8 Sale after 9 mos at 31.0% I.R.R.
BT Shipping LOSS 43.4 Sale after 9 mos at 31.6% I.R.R.
Global Ocean Carriers LOSS 10 Sale after 3 mos at 2.5% I.R.R.
MC Shipping LOSS 5.3 Sale after 9 mos at 4.0% I.R.R.
Nortankers LOSS 18.1 Sale after 9 mos at 13.5% I.R.R.
Maritime LOSS N/A N/A
Investment Fund
* I.R.R. if the investor sold their shares at the peak of their price
Source: Proceedings of the 6th International Ship Finance Conference
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Table 4.4 PERFORMANCE OF INVESTMENTS
COMPANY Offer Cumulative Average Current
Price Dividends Yield Price
U.S. dollars as of Dec 1993 1993
Anangel-American
Luxembourg investor $10 $6.85 11.00% $17.00
NASDAQ investor $16.50 $4.50 6.40% $17.00
B+H Bulk Carriers $10 $12.81 20.50% *
B+H Maritime $15 $5.87 8.70% $1.50
B+H Ocean $15 $8.70 11.60% $4.00
BT Shipping $10 $1.48 3.50% $3.25
Global Ocean Carriers $15 $3.29 4.60% $2.75
MC Shipping $15 $3.54 5.60% $3.50
Nortankers $15 $0.30 0.75% *
*These companies' stocks do not trade any more
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Chapter 5
The Investor's Point of View
Few can deny that there is money to be made in shipping. It is well
known that shipping is a high-risk high-return industry; however, in 1992 it
was estimated that in the U.S. there were only about 225 institutions holding
shipping securities with 20 per cent of those institutes holding just under 80
per cent of the equity12 . Chapter 3 discussed some of the reasons why
investors might be restrained from owing shipping stocks and bonds.
Nevertheless, it was decided that a separate discussion of the investor's point
of view is necessary in order for the reader to understand what types of
investors are represented in the capital market and what they are looking for
in a deal.
First of all, investors are overwhelmed by the complexity of the
shipping market. Good investment decisions require exhaustive analysis and
complex judgments. The products are not standardized, and conditions are
rarely replicated. Every company deals with different vessels under different
chartering policies and has very different characteristics. The fleets have
different sizes, different age structures, different capital structures and are run
by groups of people of different nationality. This presents investors with
many difficulties which prevents them from being active in the shipping
sector. "The majority of activity in the investment community today
involves the analysis of market statistics and the rapid exploitation of small
pricing anomalies, rather than the more complicated and less easily definable
business of identifying individual stocks which are under-valued" (Peter
Stokes, Maritime Consultants Ltd.)." In addition, if you look closely at the
larger funds -the mutual funds and pension funds- you find decision makers
who do not understand the cyclical nature of the shipping industry, although
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12 Furan Selz Inc., New York
they could certainly make substantial gains in shipping over the long term"
(Marine Money International). But understanding and accepting the
cyclicality of the shipping industry is key for anybody who wants to enter the
shipping business whether it is through the stockmarket or not.
Figure 5.1 depicts the high cyclicality of the industry by showing the
average earnings in U.S. dollars per day for each different type of dry cargo
vessels for the typical routes these vessels are engaged in. Figure 5.2 provides
the same information for Tankers. These values are calculated using the spot
rates prevailing during each different quarter in order to emphasize the
cyclicality of the industry. There is no need to elaborate more on the cyclicality
of the shipping industry as the previous figures capture this very well. What
is important is that the possible shipping stock investors understand that they
should not regard this cyclicality as a way to speculate and make short run
gains but decide that if they want to invest in shipping they have to do it " the
right way ". They have to consider mostly the long run profits and not rush to
sell their shares when the industry is at a low level of the cycle.
The regression analysis model developed in Chapter 7 provides an
optional way for investors to identify the individual stocks that are
undervalued and try to find a way to standardize shipping companies. Using
this model, an investor could input the characteristics of the shipping
company that he/she wants to invest in, and estimate should the price of that
stock be. If the stock price turns out to be undervalued, there is a chance of
high returns with the purchase of the stock. However, if more accuracy is
desired more data points should be included in the model and it should then
be tested again but the idea would still be the same, that is to find the
quantifiable characteristics of a listed or about to be listed company which are
most important to the performance of shipping share prices and to use the
results in order to find an approximate value of these stock prices. Also the
model may be used in order to choose the companies that possess those
desirable characteristics.
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Revenues of Dry
Figure 5.1:
Bulk Vessels based on Spot Market Rates
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Revenues of dry bulk vessels as calculated from the prevailing spot rates
during each given quarter for different types of vessels. The routes chosen as
typical for those vessels are the U.S. Gulf/Rotterdam loaded with grain for the
Handy Size, the U.S. Gulf/Japan loaded with grain for the Panamax size and
the Hampton Road/Richard bay/Japan route loaded with coal for the Cape
Size.
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Figure 5.2:
Revenues of Tankers based on Spot Market Rates
Revenues of tanker vessels as calculated from the prevailing spot rates during
each given quarter for different types of tankers. The routes chosen as typical
for those vessels are the Caribbean/U.S. Atlantic Coast route for Small
Tankers carrying clean products, the Caribbean/U.S. Gulf route carrying crude
oil for Medium Tankers, the Bonny/U.S. Gulf route for Large Tankers
carrying crude oil and the Arabic Gulf/Far East route for VLCC's carrying
crude oil.
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Unfortunately for the shipping sector, the securities industry in the
U.S. has, in the last decades, shifted away from value investments and has
become more short term oriented, rather than adopting medium or long
term criteria. As a result, highly speculative ventures are promoted whereas
worthwhile projects are rejected. Consequently, shipping entrepreneurs with
complicated projects stand a better chance of success by approaching high net
worth individuals and corporate backers rather than by doing the round of
the investment banks13. Moreover, this attitude creates problems in raising
additional capital because stocks become greatly undervalued as a result of
investors looking for the short term profits of the company. Consequently,
entrepreneurs cannot attract the funds that they want because they offer an
investment that can currently be obtained from the market at a much lower
price.
One aspect that clearly differentiates investors that are currently
thinking about entering the shipping industry is that they are evaluating each
shipping deal as an opportunity compared to other shipping deals and as an
opportunity compared to other industries. The investment world is
increasingly global, and sophisticated investors are evaluating opportunities
on a comparative basis. Within the asset-based sector shipping is merely one
alternative to be compared to oil properties, real estate, timber and mining.
The investors' difficulty in finding a shipping deal is probably less a function
of the shipping industry, and more an example of the alternatives that they
have to evaluate. The transactions in shipping have simply not been able to
compete with opportunities elsewhere, not only because the industry has not
done well, but also because of the unfavorable deal structure compared to
other industries.
There are few investors like Warren Buffet, widely regarded as the greatest of
them all, who applies fundamental analysis in his search for value and then
makes major long-term investments in the companies of his choice. Buffet
once said: " As far as I'm concerned, the stock market doesn't exist. It is there
only as a reference to see if anybody is offering to do anything foolish". Bear
that comment in mind when looking at Figure 5.3 of the performance of the
13 Peter Stokes, Maritime Consultants Ltd.
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Oslo Stock Exchange shipping sector index compared to the total Oslo Stock
Exchange index since 1983.
Figure 5.3
Source: Marsoft Database
It is the very volatility of this index which constitutes its chief
attraction to investment funds which see the potential to make very large
short-term returns on their positions. Looking at the doubling of the index
between the end of 1988 and the first quarter of 1990, or its halving between
the third quarter of 1991 and the third quarter of 1992, or indeed the fact that it
has more than doubled again since that low point, Buffet would presumably
say that he has proven his point. The various extremes of the Oslo Shipping
Index are a remarkable indicator of exaggerated optimism and pessimism -in
other words foolishness- but professional securities traders will always
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assume that they will be able to take advantage of these swings rather than
become victims of them.
As it was mentioned above, investors have shown themselves to be
remarkably insensitive to, or uninterested in, valuation criteria which are
essential in analyzing shipping shares. A stockbroking analyst even said once
that buyers of shipping shares, especially tanker shares, are simply viewing
current prices as option money payable for the right to participate in the boom
which is anticipated in one, two or three years' time. Meanwhile, buyers of
high-yielding shipping debt securities in the U.S. seem in some cases to be
remarkably relaxed about cash flow coverage of future interest charges as long
as the current value of the security package looks high enough. This attitude
suggest the possibility for future disappointment.
The fund raising community has been criticized in the past for the poor
quality of the majority of equity raising shipping. projects. It is the investors'
and fund raisers' attitudes which have attracted the likes of Nortankers,
while keeping away projects which have profiles that could bring about new
Bergensens, Stolt-Nielsens, A.P. Mollers, etc 14. But the fund raising
community cannot be blamed for tapping the capital market as aggressively as
possible for as long as investors display such an accommodating attitude.
Investors will need to find ways of evaluating shipping stocks and look
deeper into the fundamentals and long term prospects of the companies,
rather than adopting short term objectives and supporting weak asset-based
structures.
Nevertheless, shipowners should not forget that on the aggregate they
will eventually be punished if they adopt this attitude. Unfortunately, it is not
necessarily that those who will take advantage of this attitude will pay. This
presents a stronger point for equity placements than for debt placements,
where the promoters incur a high financial risk and will eventually pay if
they cannot repay the debts.
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14 Lloyd's List, May 26, 1992
If a shipowner succeeds in raising a substantial amount of money
through an I.P.O., that money is additional permanent capital and can be used
for investment in fixed assets with a long-term economic life. But as soon as
his shares are publicly quoted, he is at the mercy of the market's pricing of
these securities and the market can be erratic. If, for whatever reason there is a
sharp sell-off of the shares, the company's ability to continue using its paper
to fund fleet renewal and expansion may be severely impaired. Only when
investors realize that the way they should invest in shipping stocks is by
buying them and keeping them for long-term profits, will the shipping stock
market reach stability and become a good investment option. Perhaps
shipping is not reborn every morning but, unlike many other industries, it
isn't of danger of overmaturity. This means that shipping should be regarded
as a long life industry whose strong point is not potential growth but
"eternal" life.
The model described in Chapter 7 suggests that there exists a way to
find companies that meet the criteria. Some of these criteria are more
important than others, the quality of management being the most important
one for the investor who focuses on long term profits. However, the biggest
problem is the control and liquidity of the deals. Since the size and the
number of shipping projects is small and held by a small number of core
investors, the trading volumes are inevitably low. In addition shipping in
most markets does not even constitute a sector. It therefore has no sector
index, its market weighting is insignificant and the performance of
individual stocks is irrelevant. Consequently, most fund managers and
stockbrokers will not devote any appreciable research capacity in such a sector.
Given the emphasis that investors put on control and liquidity, the
perfect shipping investment will not exist as long as shipping remains such a
small sector of the stockmarket. This industry is too capital intensive for
investors who want to invest in the neighborhood of U.S.$10 million at a
time. Investors would prefer to take their capital, add it to that of a few
others, leverage it, start their own company, acquire a small number of ships,
and contract out the technical and commercial management. This leaves
them in the desirable position of having ultimate control over the company's
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direction and over their ability to increase or liquidate their investment.
However there are many drawbacks to this option.
First of all, this does not contribute to the diversification of the
investor's risk over a large asset base. He is also limited to ships with an older
age profile because of the relatively lower purchase price. The alternative is to
acquire a minority stake in a larger, more established entity where he can
achieve diversity over a larger asset base and hopefully a well run,
professional organization. But this option leads to little control over the
investment and its liquidity.
On the other hand the probable loss of control is the very reason why
shipowners tried to avoid financing their projects through the stockmarket in
the first place. In particular most Greek shipowners do not even want to
consider the possibility of having someone interfering with the way they run
their business. This is where shipowners and investors should compromise
because both are right in a sense but neither one is willing to change his
attitude. Nevertheless, Greek shipowners will eventually have to change
their secretive attitude anyway because of the formation of increasingly
stricter regulations imposed by the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) every year.
What investors want is not control of day-to-day company operations
because this is not their intent and they cannot run a shipping company.
Investors are well aware of the fact that shipping is an area where experience
is almost everything and it would be foolish of them to think that they can do
better than a shipowner who has had first hand experience with the cyclicality
of the market itself. But investors still need the ability to control operations
should they disagree with management on fundamental strategic issues. If
this is the case, investors would want to be able to walk away from the deal
either through the forced sale of ships -the shipowners nightmare- or by
putting their investment back to the company. Shipowners have the
tendency to believe that investors should just be passive and let owners do
whatever they think is best for the company but this endangers the investors
much more than the owners. The only way this attitude could work is if the
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management owns a large number of shares of the company that it is
running. This way the problem of conflicting incentives would be eliminated.
There is however another solution to this problem, i.e., the
comfortability of the investor with the liquidity or exit options. As mentioned
before, a private shipping company liquidity can come either through forced
sale of the ship or by putting financial instruments back into the company, for
example making owners buy back all shares in case of a public company.
However these exit options have ended a surprising number of potential
shipping transactions. What the shipping industry came up with is another
option, that of limited life funds which was discussed in more detail in
Chapter 4.
Unfortunately for shipowners, the latest decade has made investment
in shipping even riskier than it was before because of increasing
environmental regulations and most importantly the spotty history of
providing adequate returns for financial investors. Shipowners should be
aware of this and will have to provide deals with better terms if the industry
wants to attract new sources of capital.
Concluding, there are many new investors who consider the shipping
industry more seriously. By doing so, they will increasingly be global,
sophisticated investors, who regardless of the depth of their industry
knowledge can cope with the issues described in this work. But the future of
shipping in the capital markets will be determined by three parties: analysts,
investors and shipowners and/or promoters of funds.
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Chapter 6
The Shipowner's Point of View
In Chapter 3, the advantages and disadvantages of equity and/or bond
offerings for shipowners where discussed. However, there are some other
issues which shipowners should consider before they decide to raise capital
through any stock exchange.
First of all, the timing of the attempt of any listing is the most crucial
factor for the success of a deal. In fact the best time to raise equity is neither at
the bottom nor at the top of the shipping cycle. As a matter of fact, if a
shipping company's IPO is a success at the bottom of the shipping cycle,
speculative investors will be satisfied because they would see their
investment perform well. On the other hand, the shipowner will probably
have to sell his stocks at a large discount since it would be really hard to
convince investors that the bottom of the cycle has been reached.
Nevertheless, applying for a listing at the top of the cycle is advantageous for
the shipowner who would probably sell his shares at a premium, but would
not be welcome by any investor who would soon note the drop of his stock
prices as well as the nonexistence of dividends.
This point has been proved by the results of past listings. Shipping
companies like Anangel-American, B+H Bulk Carriers and First Olsen which
were correct on their timing satisfied their investors at least for the first
couple of years. On the other hand, B+H Ocean Carriers, B+H Maritime
Carriers and Nortankers which were not right on their timing proved to be a
disaster for investors who wanted short term profits. Since most types of
shipping stock investors as they were described in Chapter 5, were speculative
investors who desired short run gains and were not experienced with the
shipping industry cyclicality, they were not patient to hold their stocks and
wait for the market to improve but instead rushed to sell them. As a result
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the prices of these stocks were really undervalued and some of those
companies do not trade anymore mostly because of this investors' attitude.
However, the bad timing of the listing of those companies was not the only
reason why the deals failed. As discussed in Chapter 7, there are also
microeconomic factors that are extremely important in the success of a listing.
It is the combination of good timing and all the characteristics to be described
Chapter 7, which make for the first successful step of a listing.
Shipowners who are experienced with the cyclicality of the shipping
industry hold the wheel on the success of their investment. Even if
shipowners cannot persuade investors that the cyclicality of the shipping
industry is a necessary evil as well as the reason why so much money can and
has been made in shipping, then they can at least control the timing of their
issue and make sure it is on the inflection point of this cycle. Fortunately for
investors, the bottom of the shipping cycle is easy to predict and possible
attempts to raise equity during these periods usually result in the failure of
the IPO's. Examples of such listings that have been aborted are Bay Ocean
Carriers, Jason Overseas, B+H Crude Carriers, Viking Star and Astro
Shipping. What happened in these cases is that investors thought the deals
where overpriced and they didn't allow them to succeed in the first place.
Nevertheless there are more factors involved in finding the good timing for a
shipping company listing besides choosing the right shipping cycle timing.
As with any other publicly listed company, the interest rates of banks as
determined by macroeconomic factors will affect the pricing of any shipping
company stock. In periods of high interest rates investors decide to invest in
less risky instruments than shipping stocks. However, in low interest rate
periods investors would turn to the stock market for higher returns.
Therefore, the correct timing for a speculative investor to buy shipping stocks
would be when low interest rates are prevailing and the shipping cycle is in
its upturn. However, the time when the cycle will be at each bottom will
eventually come and then the speculative investor will decide to sell his
shares especially if interest rates are not low enough to make him remain a
player in the stockmarket.
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All these issues are proof of how difficult it is for a shipping company
to perform well in the stockmarket. Currently the shipping stock market is a
place where most people invest for short term profits. How else can one
explain the fact that banks have been lending millions of dollars to
shipowners with reasonable to very good terms. Nevertheless, shipping is a
very peculiar industry and has not been analyzed extensively by institutional
investors and investment banks. When investors realize that they should
change the way they value shipping shares, there will be many more shipping
companies financing their fleets through the capital markets. If investors
understood the possible long run profits from shipping stocks and if they
were patient and waited for the booms, shipping would be an industry they
would invest in and more capital would be available for shipping from these
"long term" investors.
Until then, shipowners, and particularly Greek shipowners, will most
likely stay faithful to their bankers because they understand their needs and
know the business as well as they do. But there is no reason why stockmarket
investors should let bankers make all the shipping finance profits once
investors realize the peculiarity and potential of the shipping industry .
Mr. Kanellakis, the president of the highly successful Anangel
American stated during a recent interview that because of the current
investor's attitude towards shipping stocks, no shipping company should
abandon its "cozy" relationship with bankers in order to enter the
stockmarket unless it has other reasons, like the urgent need to keep its cash
flows as opposed to paying bank term loan interests or to "experiment" with
the stockmarket. The first point was proved by the bond offering of Eletson, a
company that does not hide the fact that cash flows were more important to
its projects than the need for bank loans.
Interestingly enough, Anangel-American, one of the most successful
shipping companies listed in the stock market, was able to perform well by
persuading its investors that they should trust the company and it proved in
term to the investors that the management was faithful and deserved their
trust. What can be deduced from the author's discussion with Mr. Kanellakis
is that if a shipping company considers seriously to finance its vessels
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through the stockmarket, it should do it the "right way". It should start with a
public offering in a relatively small stockmarket for which it fulfills the
necessary requirements and then aim for larger stockmarkets like that of the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) when additional amounts of capital will be
needed.
Mr. Kanellakis also suggested that private placements in shipping
should be avoided because of the high risks for investors associated with
them, unless the promoters of these funds show their dedication to the good
performance of the funds with their large equity participation in these deals.
But even in this case, there is a high liability risk for investors as they would
probably have to hold large percentage of the total company shares, usually in
the order of 25 percent, thus subjecting themselves to the possibility to be held
liable for the damages in case of company's vessel accident. As a result, it is
better both for shipowners and investors to pursue a deal comprised of many
investors, each owning less than three percent of the shares of that project.
This can only be achieved if a public offering takes place in a stockmarket.
An interesting comment worth discussing was made by Mr. Kanellakis.
His point was why there has been no shipowner who has bought himself
shipping stocks of other shipping companies. One would assume that this
would be the case given the fact that shipowners know the shipping industry
well enough to enjoy long term gains from such an investment. One possible
explanation is that because shipowners know the industry, they could use
their funds to invest in their company instead of sharing the profits with
other shipowners.
What merits further research is whether individuals involved with
shipping industry but who are not shipowners themselves would invest in
shipping stocks. There are quite a few such people in Greece who are not
shipowners themselves but await for such an opportunity. Recall that in
Chapter 5, it was mentioned that under current industry conditions it is not
possible for such individuals to become shipowners. However, it would be
interesting to see how would such individuals react if a well management
shipping company ever got a listing in the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE).
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Another issue that specifically tanker shipowners must be aware of, if
they want to incorporate their company, is the issue of liability. It is the U.S.
that strongly influences the future of the tanker side of the shipping industry.
It is the U.S. that imposed the double hull restriction for tankers and it is the
U.S. that is so concerned about the damages of the environment and enforces
financial reliability requirements on owners. Unfortunately Americans are
the only ones who understand the risks of polluting the environment and
they are the only ones who can do something to avert catastrophic damages.
As a result, it is better for tanker owners to issue shipping stocks in the U.S.
where the laws are enforced and unexpected extra environmental cost
burdens can be avoided. Investors in that market are aware of pending new
laws affecting tankers, thus are rational in their decisions.
To conclude, it is clear from the above discussion that the nature of the
shipping industry is such that shipowners are not easily convinced to turn to
the equity markets for their financing needs. However, they have the power
to change the banking finance trend and make the stockmarket a major
source of shipping finance. It is the future generation of shipowners who will
decide whether to initiate such a trend.
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Chapter 7
A Regression Analysis Model which
Asserts the Determinants of
Shipping Stock Price Performance
7.1) The Goal of the Model
It is quite difficult to standardize shipping companies since each
individual company has a combination of characteristics that rarely resemble
those of another shipping company. As a result, a detailed analysis of each
individual company is necessary when one considers investing in shipping
companies. This is one of the main reasons why up until know shipping has
been such a closely held industry, with each company's financing often
performed by the same banks since the company's inception. Moreover, it is
very difficult to compare the performance of shipping stocks to those of other
industries since the standard ratios used for those comparisons are not very
indicative in the case of shipping shares. For example, the expected future
growth rate of a company, which is an important factor in the analysis of a
company's performance is not so important in shipping since growth is not
the industry's strong point. However, despite the difficulty in performing
such comparative analyses, it is possible, particularly due to the shipping
stock surge of the last six years, to use statistical models in order to perform
shipping company valuations.
The model described in this chapter will attempt to quantify the most
important shipping company characteristics, compare their importance for
shipping stock performance and produce a valuation method that could be
used both by shipowners and shipping stock investors as well as any bank or
investment firm interested in underwriting a shipping stock issue.
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Moreover, the model will demonstrate that there exists a way to protect the
unsophisticated investors of the ASE, by ensuring that the shipping
companies which apply for a listing possess the characteristics proved to be
important by this model. The results of the model should prompt the Athens
Stock Exchange Council to reconsider its current position of not allowing
merchant shipping companies to be listed in that exchange.
The model is useful to shipping stock investors because it provides to
them a rough method for checking whether a shipping stock price is
undervalued or overvalued. Shipowners on the other hand, could use it to
check whether their company or a startup project possess the characteristics
needed in order to consider a listing in a stock exchange. It could also be used
as an alternative company valuation method to be compared to existing
company valuation methods. Finally, investment firms and banks could use
it as an alternative way to value a shipping company in addition to typical
methods that are being used so farls.. It is common for financiers to use
different company valuation methods for comparative purposes. The one
described here is probably the simplest one and could be used as a check to the
more complex analytical methods currently available. The model essentially
predicts the value which stock market investors put on a company and would
be relevant to companies that are listed or consider a listing in a stock
exchange.
The fundamental idea is to perform a Regression Analysis with
shipping stock prices as the dependent variable and the most important
characteristics of the shipping companies as well as the market conditions as
the independent variables. The main use of a regression analysis model is to
provide a way to check the dependence of the variable to be regressed, in our
case the shipping stock price, to the independent variables, in our case the
characteristics of a shipping company and the shipping market conditions.
The model is to indicate those microeconomic factors, i.e., those
characteristics of shipping companies, that signal the future good
15 Two methods are typically used for valuing shipping companies. One is the Net Asset
Valuation method which is based on the values of the vessels owned by the company if they
were for sale. The second one used mostly is the US. is the Cash Flow projection method which
is considering predictions of the future Cash Flows of the company and adjusts them to their
present value.
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performance of a company's stock. Moreover, it will show the importance of
the shipping market performance as seen from the charter rates prevailing
during each period, on the price of shipping stocks. There are various
characteristics that are perceived to be significant in the performance of a
shipping company such as:
* The Financial Leverage (Debt Structure)
* The Age Profile and Size of the fleet
* The Quality of the Fleet, Particularly Double Hull and Similar
Provisions
* The Chartering Policy or Other Employment Strategy
* The Specific Market Orientation and Fleet Composition of each
Company (e.g. Bulk, Tanker, Mixed etc.)
* The proposed Life of the Company (Limited Life vs Going
Concern)
* The Equity Participation of the Promoter/Owner/Manager
The Dividend Policy
* The Management/Track Record
* The Working Capital
These characteristics as well as the stock prices of shipping companies
and the market condition are going to be the inputs to the regression analysis
of this chapter. The model will combine time series and cross sectional data1 6
in order to include as many data points as possible.
It should be noted here that although most of these characteristics were
initially included in the model, many of them proved to be statistically
insignificant and irrelevant to the stock price performance. Section 7.3
includes a description of these characteristics as well as a discussion of their
perceived importance by the members of the shipping community. In the
same section, results of the model are compared to theoretical predictions.
16 Cross sectional data refers to different data points taken at the same chronological time (in
this work, different shipping companies' stock prices at the same date). Time series data refers
to data taken at different point in time (here, the stock price of a particular shipping company
at different dates).
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Finally, the results of the final run of the model as well as a discussion of the
usefulness of these results are going to be included in Section 7.4.
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7.2) Methodology
In general, a Regression Analysis model can be written as:
P(i,t)=a(i,t)+bl(i,t)Xl(i,t)+b2(i,t)X2(i,t)+...+bj (i,t)Xj (i,t)+e(i,t)
for i = 1,2 ....... N
t = 1,2, .......T for j = 1,2 .....,J
where: N = the number of cross-section units (companies)
T = the number of time periods
J = the number of explanatory (independent) variables
P(i,t) = the dependent variable, here. the share price of the
companies being analyzed
a(i,t) = the intercept term of the model
bj(i,t) = the coefficient of each explanatory variable
X(i,t) = the explanatory or independent variables i.e. the
characteristics described above
e(i,t) = the error term
A variety of models has been proposed for time series and cross
sectional data which may be derived from the above equation by varying the
assumptions made about the intercept term of the model, the slope
coefficients and the error term. A possible taxonomy of models is indicated in
Table 7.2.a.
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Table 7.2.a: Taxonomy of time series, cross section models
Model Intercept a(i,t) Slope coefficient b(i,t) Error Term e(i,t)
1 zero common for all i,t Fixed effects
2 common for all i,t common for all i,t E(ee')=Var(u)*l
3 common for all i,t common for all i,t E(uu')=V
4 varying over i common for all i,t Fixed effects
5 varying over i common for all i,t Random effects
6 varying over i,t common for all i,t Fixed effects
7 varying over i,t common for all i,t Random effects
8 varying over i varying over i E(uu')=Var(u)*I
Model number one was chosen as most appropriate for this work
because of the following reasons:
1. It must be assumed that slope coefficients do not vary over individual
companies in order for the model to be useful. In fact, the result showed that
the slope coefficient was statistically insignificant, therefore, Model 1 was
more appropriate than Model 4.
2. All Individual company particularities are going to be captured by the
management variable; or else a dummy variable would have to be included
for each company. Because of the large number of companies included, these
"dummies" would reduce the degrees of freedom. They would also be against
the purpose of the model, i.e., to find a way to value any shipping company
regardless of the very particular individual company differences.
The above features reduce the general Regression Analysis model to the
following form:
P(t)=blXl(t)+b2X2(t)+...+BjXj (t)+e(t)
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where: t = 1,2, ......T
= 1,2, ..... ,J
T = the number of time periods
J = the number of explanatory (independent) variables
P(t) = the dependent variable i.e. the share price of the
companies analyzed
bj = the coefficient of each explanatory variable
Xj(t) = the explanatory or independent variables i.e. the
characteristics described earlier
e(t) = the error term
It should be mentioned here that before choosing the above method,
many trial runs took place, some of which included various dummy
variables that turned out to be insignificant. It is worthwhile to note two
such interesting "dummy" variables that were dropped out from the final
output, namely, the Oslo and the US dummy variables. These variables took
the value of 1 when the relevant company had a listing in the Oslo or the US
Stock Exchange respectively and zero otherwise. The results showed that
statistically speaking, the choice of stock exchange did not affect the value of
shipping stocks. The implication of this result is that there is no major
difference between issuing shipping stocks in the U.S., Oslo or any other
country whose stock market includes the shipping sector. However, further
information and data from public shipping companies listed in many
different world stock exchanges is needed in order to verify this conclusion.
Another important variable that was eventually dropped from the
model was the stock exchange index of the country of each company's listing
at each particular data point. For example, the S&P 500 index could have been
included to account for the influence of the general performance of the U.S.
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stock market on U.S. shipping Stocks. On the other hand, the Oslo Stock
Exchange total index could have been used similarly for the companies listed
in the Oslo stock exchange. The reason why these variables were dropped
from the model is that they were multicollinear with the shipping index
variable which turned out to be more significant than the stock market
performance index. Since the results are better when the shipping index is
used instead of the market index, keeping the former index seemed more
appropriate. Yet, the reason for the multicollinearity of these indexes is that
both indexes are very sensitive to the Gross National Product (G.N.P.) of the
relevant country. In particular, the shipping index is very sensitive to the
world economy in general and factors such as steel production and energy
consumption which in turn are influenced by the U.S. economy. Since most
companies in the model were listed in the U.S., the multicollinearity of the
shipping index with the S&P 500 index was expected.
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7.3) Description Of The Variables
Used In The Model
Financial Leverage (Debt Structure):
Even though, according to Modigliani and Miller the financial
structure of a company is irrelevant to its performance in a tax free
environment, in reality this might not be so. It was also shown by
Modigliani and Miller that the tax deductibility of debt interest rates raises the
company's values. However, it has been perceived that in the shipping
world, the smaller the Debt to Equity (D/E) ratio, the better the company's
performance. In fact, it has been shown that the degree of financial leverage
accentuates the shipping cycle more than can be compensated by tax
advantages. Therefore, the company's financial record should show net debt
generally remaining below 40% of total capital employed 17 and operating cash
flow usually covering interest charges more than three times. Operating cash
flow should have remained positive after interest charges throughout all
stages of the shipping cycle, and cash flow returns on capital should average
more than 10% per annum over the cycle.
A possible explanation as to why the low D/E ratios are better for a
public shipping company is that the low or nonexistent taxes which shipping
companies usually pay make tax advantages of debt irrelevant to the
performance of these companies. In fact, the results of the regression analysis
suggested that the higher the D/E ratio of shipping companies, the lower their
stock price, however, keeping in mind that the results were statistically
significant only at the 8% level. Nevertheless, the results agree with what
experts of the shipping community believe on the effect of the leverage of a
public shipping company on its stock price.
17 Peter Stokes, Shipping's Track Record as a Basis for Attracting Capital, Proceedings of the
6th International Ship Finance Conference, Lloyd's of London Press Ltd, 1994
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Age Profile And Size Of The Fleet:
The question of age is becoming more sensitive as the shipping market
increasingly adopts a quality-conscious stance. The continuously imposed
regulations suggest that the quality of the vessels is going to be increasingly
important in the future. The OPA 90 with its double-hull requirements and
the increasing fear of unlimited liability have mostly affected the tanker
industry but also the total shipping sectors in general. Moreover, through the
recently imposed Rule for Financial Responsibility Requirements, OPA will
enforce the financial responsibility requirements which failed to be
implemented by CERCLA in the past. This Certificate of Financial
Responsibility Requirement (COFR) together with other imminent
requirements impose another burden to the owners, in particular, those who
don't own quality vessels. Nevertheless, those requirements will solve the
problem of unlimited liability for those owners whose vessels are qualified.
However, age alone cannot determine the quality of the vessel, neither
can the age profile of the fleet provide any indication of the standards
maintained by different shipowners. Yet, age does seem to be an important
determinant of earning potential as well as the price of shipping stocks.
Nevertheless, according to Peter Stokes, the Managing Director of Maritime
Consultants Ltd.18, a company that wants to tap the stock market successfully
should have a fleet of more than 10 vessels with a balanced age profile,
including some fully amortized ships producing a base of free cash flow, some
more modern tonnage and a newbuilding program. Also, the capital
commitments for the newbuilding program should not be excessive in
relation to existing capital employed and the technical quality of the fleet
should be independently verifiable as excellent. As seen from the results of
the model, the larger the number of vessels of a company, the higher its price
should be. But this does not imply that there are increasing returns to scale in
shipping. It simply suggests that most public shipping companies that have a
large number of vessels issued their shares at an initially higher price instead
of issuing more shares at a lower price. On the other hand, it turned out that
18 Peter Stokes, Shipping's Track Record as a Basis for Attracting Capital, Proceedings of the
6th International Ship Finance Conference, Lloyd's of London Press Ltd, 1994
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the coefficient of the variable representing average strongly influenced the
price of shipping stocks.
Quality Of Vessel:
As described above the quality of vessels, rather than their age, might
be a better way to assess their seaworthiness . However, information about
quality values is harder to obtain as opposed to age. If such information was
easily accessible, quality of vessels would be a better variable for the model
compared to average age.
Chartering Policy:
The chartering policy of a company defines whether its vessels are
going to be employed on a long-term charter, bareboat charter or in the spot-
market. Time charters represent a more conservative chartering policy
whereas "playing" in the spot market is riskier, but with higher potential
returns or losses. Bareboat charters are the least risky form of chartering and
are commonly referred as leasing. In order to see whether the chartering
policy of a public company affects its price, a chartering policy variable was
included in the model. The variable was defined as the percentage of Dead
Weight Tonnage (DWT) charted long term out of the total DWT owned
during each year. However, because it turned out that this variable was
multicollinear with the Management variable to be discussed later, it was
eventually dropped out of the model as it was somehow represented by the
Management variable.
Nevertheless, the fact that some of the companies which were analyzed
operate a large number of liner vessels, posed a problem because liner vessels
operate under established rate schedules. Therefore, liner vessels had to be
classified as vessels being on long-term charter thus providing the company
with relatively certain future income. Also any specialized vessels where
classified as long term charters since they produce a more certain cash flow
than typical dry cargo and tanker vessels.
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The Specific Market Orientation And Fleet Composition Of Each
Company (e.g. Bulk, Tanker, Mixed etc.):
It was mentioned earlier that tanker ownership is perceived riskier due
to all the uncertainty of the increasing importance of environmental
regulations. In order to see whether the composition of the fleet influences
the shipping stock prices, a variable defined as the percentage of tankers over
the total vessels owned by the company was included in the model. Since
cruise line companies were not included in the model, this variable basically
suggests whether a company owns mainly tankers or bulk carriers. However,
for those companies which also own containerships or other types of vessels
this variable represented the percentage of the number of tanker vessels
owned out of the total number of company vessels.
It could be argued that there is no reason to include this variable in the
model. However, as the results showed, it turned out that the coefficient of
this variable is positive and significant. This can be explained by the fact that
since tankers are generally more expensive than bulk carriers of the same age,
the value of a tanker owning company similar in size and average age to a dry
bulk owning company will have a higher value hence a higher stock price
than the latter. Moreover, the freight rates of tankers are generally higher to
those of similar in DWT and age dry bulkers. Still, the results do not imply
better performance for shipping stocks of a tanker owning shipping company.
They imply, however, that the value of those companies are higher. It
should be kept in mind that the purpose of the model is to find a way to
standardize shipping companies in general regardless of the type, number and
age of their vessels.
The Proposed Life Of The Company (Limited Life vs Going
Concern):
As it was discussed in detail in Chapter 4, start-up shipping projects
which generally include a limited-life provision, might perform differently in
the stockmarket because of this provision. Recall that investors of this type of
company are risk takers focusing on asset play rather than steady earnings
from dividend payout ratios. As a result we would expect their stock prices to
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be lower than the prices of similar ongoing entities. In order to check this
further, a variable (Dummy variable) was included in the model which took
the value of one if the company had a limited life provision and zero
otherwise.
However, the results showed that this variable was irrelevant to the
stock price performance. A possible explanation to the insignificance of this
variable is that by including it in the model, multicollinearity was introduced
with the dividend variable which will be discussed later. This result was
expected since it was evident by the data that the companies that were of the
limited life fund type gave more dividends than their ongoing entity
counterparts. Dropping this instead of the dividend variable, however,
seemed to be more reasonable and proved to be a better solution for the
output of the model.
Dividend Policy;
The dividend policy of every public company is considered to be very
important for the satisfaction of investors. As a result, dividends paid during
each year are expected to influence the stock prices of any public company.
Even though Modigliani and Miller showed that in a tax free and ideal
economic environment dividend policy is irrelevant to the value of a
company, when tax issues and other imperfections are introduced into the
economy, dividends paid do have a great influence on the stock price of that
company. Keeping that in mind, the management of a public company
typically aims at a stable dividend stream since it has been shown that
investors prefer stable dividends than erratic dividend payout ratios.
However, looking at public shipping company dividend payout ratios, we can
see that most of the managers of these companies do not agree with the need
for a stable dividend payout policy. With the exception of few companies,
most dividends paid to shipping stock investors were special dividends
because of abnormal returns of the companies. Table 4.4 and Appendix 7.c
show the unsteadiness of the dividend policies of some public shipping
companies of the limited life fund type. However, it was unstable dividends
that made the investment in such stocks attractive in the first place.
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Nevertheless, despite the unstable dividend policies of public shipping
companies, the model shows that yearly dividends paid to stockholders
affected the price of the relevant shipping stock shares. In fact, it was shown
that a one dollar dividend paid resulted in a $.673 drop of the stock price. Yet,
before commenting on these results, it should be noted that it is reasonable
for any company's stock price to drop after the announcement of the
dividends to be paid by as much as the amount of dividends paid. For
example, if a company's stock price was ten dollars before an announcement
of a one dollar dividend for each share, it would be normal for that share
price to drop to nine dollars after the announcement. Therefore, the results
of the model suggest that in fact, the higher the dividends paid, the better off
the investor is but the lower the value of the firm. Indeed, the value of the
firm will have to drop because there is less working capital available for the
company since it was used to pay dividends to the shareholders. To conclude,
it was shown that dividends paid are perceived as a good sign for the
company's performance by the investors.
Management/Track Record:
Bankers value the management track record as the most important
determinant when structuring a term loan for a shipping company. More
specifically, the ability of managers to adapt to the cyclical fluctuations of the
shipping industry is one of the determining factors for bankers to give loans.
This is particularly true in weathering market crises, where resourcefulness
in income generation and cost budgeting have often been critical in ensuring
survival. However, it is very difficult to evaluate the management track
record of a company and thus include it as a variable in the model.
In this work, the Management Track Record was defined by comparing
each company's individual performance to the average performance of all
shipping companies which were analyzed. First, the Return on Assets (ROA)
of each company was calculated for each year by dividing the net yearly
income by the total current assets of the company. This ratio explains fairly
well the ability of management to manage its assets i.e. run the shipping
business. Then an average value of all companies' ROA was calculated again
for each year. The yearly management value for each company was defined
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as the difference of the ROA of that company in a given year from the average
ROA value calculated earlier. Appendix 7a shows how the management
values were obtained by considering ROA values of several companies.
It should be kept in mind that another possible way of quantifying the
management value is by looking at the revenues generated by each company
and comparing them to the revenues that would have been generated if the
average appropriate one year time charter equivalent rate had been used for
each particular vessel. However, this method was not pursued here, as the
method based on ROA was deemed sufficient and simple enough to capture
the main differences in management track records of different companies.
Equity Participation Of The Promoter/Owner:
As it was discussed in Chapter 4, the equity participation of a
company's promoters could influence the performance of that company.
However, it was not possible to obtain values for the equity participation of
the owners on each company for each year, as such data is unavailable.
Working Capital
The Working Capital of a company is collectively known as the current
assets and current liabilities. It is generally accepted that the Net Working
Capital, i.e. current assets less current liabilities, is an indication of the ability
of a company to overcome difficulties. Moreover, the high value of the Net
Working Capital is also a sign of good management. Nevertheless, the
results of the Regression Analysis suggested that the value of that variable did
no affect the shipping stock prices significantly.
Price of Shipping Stock:
The price of the stock of each shipping company at each particular
point in time was chosen as the dependent variable. All figures were
converted to U.S. dollars using the appropriate exchange rate at each data
point. Moreover, all share prices and dividends were adjusted for any stock
split that occurred during the period analyzed.
81
Shipping Market Conditions:
To quantify the shipping cycle at each particular data point (either end
of June or end of December of each year) an index called RIRINDEX was
created as follows. First a Dry Bulk Index and a Tanker Index were created
separately. The Dry Bulk Index was defined as the average one year time
charter rate of all types of dry bulk vessels. The first step was to find the
average one year time charter rate for a typical Handy Size, a typical Panamax
and a typical Cape Size vessel for each relevant quarter. Then, using the
DWT percentage of each of those categories, the average typical dry bulk
vessel one year time charter rate was calculated for each relevant quarter.
Appendix 7b shows the values of the parameters used for the creation of this
index as well as the Tanker Index which was created in a similar fashion.
Since data points were taken either at the end of June or December, only those
two quarters were used to build the indexes.
As it mentioned above the Tanker index was created by finding the one
year time charter rates for typical Small Tankers, Medium Tankers, Large
Tankers and Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC) and finding their weighted
average value using the DWT percentage of each of those categories for each
relevant quarter. Appendix 7b contains the calculations and the values used
for the creation of this index. However, because each company operates a
mixture of tankers and dry bulk vessels it was appropriate for the final
shipping market index to be different for each company. As a result, the final
index, named RIRINDEX was defined as follows:
INDEX=(%tankers owned) X Tanker Index+(1-%tankers owned) X Bulk Index
for each company and each data point
RIRINDEX=INDEX(at relevant data point) / INDEX (at year 90.4)
for each company and each data point
Year 1990.4 was chosen as a base year randomly in order to make the
index unitless. As a check to the calculations it was ensured that each
company had a value of one for the RIRINDEX in 1990.4.
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The results of the regression analysis suggested that the shipping index
had a strong influence on shipping stock prices at the 100% level of
significance. Moreover, the results suggest that most investors are indeed
speculative and value their stock according to how high one year time charter
rates are at each particular point in time. But as it has been mentioned
throughout this work the high cyclicality of the shipping industry is an
irreversible fact that has to be dealt with by investors who should use their
shipping stocks as a long term investment instrument and not as a
speculative short term potential investment. But for those who still want to
be speculative, buying shipping stocks when the shipping market is at its
bottom is a risky investment with potentially high returns .
As it was mentioned in Section 7.2, there were also other variables
included during the initial trial runs of the model. But, it is not part of this
work to show the steps taken to reach the actual results. The variables
described here, however, were the ones of most importance even though
some of them ended up to be insignificant to the valuation of the dependent
variable. The next section includes a discussion of the results of the
Regression Analysis and indicates areas of concern on those results. It also
identifies the usefulness of the model to any party involved or wishing to be
involved in the shipping industry.
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7.4) Results and their Application
Appendix 7c shows the inputs to the regression analysis of this work. It
should be noted that data points were taken for either the end of June or the
end of December for each year depending on what data was available for each
company. Moreover, most companies included were listed in the U.S.
market and were start-up projects instead of ongoing entities. However, the
input variables varied significantly among companies thus accounting for a
variety of type of shipping projects.
The statistical results of the model are given in Appendix 7d and
should be self explanatory to a reader with basic knowledge of the regression
analysis method. However, a more detailed explanation of these results is
necessary. First of all, the signs of the coefficients turned out to be as expected.
The age coefficient turned out to be negative suggesting that the higher the
average age of the company's vessels, the lower the stock price. The tanker
coefficient turned out to be positive suggesting that tanker ownership leads to
higher stock prices. This result was not evident beforehand but is statistically
significant to the 100% level of significance.
As expected, the management coefficient had a positive sign since the
better the management track record, the better the stock price performance.
Also expected was the positive sign of the index variable suggesting that the
higher the freight rates, the higher the stock prices. The dividend coefficient
had a negative sign because, as described in Section 7.3, with the
announcement of dividends to be paid, stock prices are expected to drop as
much as the amount of dividends to be paid. The number of vessels variable
had also a positive sign verifying that a public shipping company should
have a large number of vessels. Finally, the leverage variable had a negative
coefficient verifying that high D/E ratios are not a good sign for the healthy
performance of shipping companies.
The important result of the model is its high adjusted squared multiple
R which turned out to be 93%, indicating that a very good sample was chosen
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to describe the dependent variable. What this value indicates is that 93% of
the shipping stock price can be explained by the independent variables used in
the model. Moreover most T statistic values showed that results were
acceptable at least at the 95% level of significance.
The results of the model could be used in many ways. One of them is
to indicate the most important predictable determinants of stock price
performance In this case predictable refers to items that can be forecast.
Moreover the model predicts how sensitive stock prices are to changes in
these determinants. For example, the decision by a company to buy newer
vessels of a certain type, the announcement of dividends and the decision to
borrow more money are all factors that can be predicted. Using the
coefficients of the model, an investor could forecast how the price of the stock
should have performed after the announcement. If, the stock price calculated
is more than the actual stock price after the announcement, there is a
possibility that this share is undervalued and the investor should consider
buying that stock. If, on the other hand, the stock price after the
announcement is found less by the model than it actually is, the stock is
probably overpriced and should be sold before its price drops.
As an example suppose a company's shipping stock price at a certain
time was $10. Suppose also that the holding company announces a change in
its D/E ratio from 50% to 60%. The model predicts a decrease of
2.904*(.1)=$.29 in the stock price . If right after the announcement the price of
the stock decreases by more than that, the stock is predicted undervalued by
the model and should be bought by a possible investor. If on the other hand
the stock price increases after the announcement, all other variables
remaining constant, it is probably overvalued and should be sold before its
price drops. Another example could be the decision of a company to buy
tankers increasing its tanker variable by 10%. The model predicts that such an
action, given all other variables are kept constant, would increase the stock
price by .097*10=$.97. Again, the predicted price should be compared to the
actual price in order to make a decision about buying a stock or selling it.
The model above can also be used in conjunction with a model
predicting the time charter rates of vessels. If there is strong support that the
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shipping market index (RIRINDEX in the model) will increase, then the
coefficient of that variable could be used to predict the shipping price change.
Then, depending on the results, the stock will be either overvalued or
undervalued. It should be mentioned here that not only the investors but
also the promoters of the funds could use this model to predict the effect of
their actions on the price of their company's shares.
The model can also be used as a supplement to other stock pricing
instrument for shares of a company about to be listed. For example, suppose
that the Maritime Investment Fund (MIF) which was not included in the
model was in need of pricing its shares at the end of 1993. MIF was composed
of four tanker vessels of 10.75 years of average age, had in 1993 a value for
management of 18.1%, had D/E ratio of .909 and the RIRINDEX for the
company for that year was 0.884. The model predicts that its stock price
should be -0.589 * 10.75 +.097* 100 + .092 * 18.1 + 12.773 * .884 + .149* - 2.904 *
.909 = $14.28. Regarding the number of shares to be issued, this will be
determined by the amount of money needed to be raised by the company.
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7.5) Possible Improvements
There are several improvements that can be made to the model of this
chapter. First of all, both more time series as well as cross sectional data
points would enhance the results and allow for further model evaluation.
Ideally, all public merchant shipping companies for each of the year they were
trading should be included. Moreover, semiannual or even quarterly data for
those companies would allow one to include even more data points in the
Regression Analysis. Including more companies (cross sectional data) into
the model would also allow for the use of the limited Life Dummy Variable
which was prevented from being used because it distorted the results. If the
sample of ongoing entities was bigger, that variable would probably deduce
useful information about the difference in expectations of investors of this
type of companies compared to investors in ongoing entity company stocks.
Also, the VESSEL variable might have been defined differently, for example
as the total DWT instead of the number of vessels owned by a firm. Also, the
TANKER variable might have been defined as DWT percentage of tankers
compared to the total DWTs owned by a firm.
Another way the model could be improved is by defining the
MANAGEMENT variable more accurately. Such a definition could be
achieved by calculating the revenues of a company had it chartered its vessels
at the average time charter rate of each period and comparing the results to
the actual revenues of those vessels.
A test that could be used to ensure the accuracy of the model which
would be feasible if more data points were available to us is the following.
Different random samples could be tested using the same dependent and
independent variables. If regardless of the sample the results were the same,
this would serve as a check to their accuracy. However, the limited number
of data points available prohibited the use of this test.
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APPENDIX 7a
CALCULATION OF THE VALUE OF MANAGEMENT
Comments: Due to the lack of information available, many values of the
ROA for some companies were not available for some data points. However,
the results are still a good indication for the value of the management of each
company for the relevant year of operation.
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COMPANY YEAR Anangel B+H B+H B+H Global Norta MC Avg
American Bulk Maritime Ocean Ocean Ship ROA
OA 892 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.91
NGMT 892 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
OA 89.4 N/A 68.60 N/A N/A N/A -8.70 N/A 12.76
NGMT 89.4 N/A 55.84 N/A N/A N/A -21.46 N/A
OA 902 1322 N/A 9.99 10.58 N/A N/A 2.76 5.6
NGMT 902 7.56 N/A 433 4.92 N/A N/A -2.90
OA 90.4 13.22 -22.00 9.99 10.58 240 N/A 2.76 3.56
NGMT 90.4 9.66 -25.56 6.43 7.02 -1.16 N/A -0.80
OA 912 11.28 N/A -3.61 -3.54 N/A N/A 1.90 -1.59
NGMT 91.2 12.87 N/A -2.02 -1.95 N/A N/A 3.49
ROA 91.4 11.28 -39.00 -3.61 -3.54 5.10 N/A 1.90 -4.2
NGMT 91.4 15.56 -34.72 0.67 0.74 9.38 N/A 6.18
OA 922 5.62 N/A -28.08 -8.17 N/A N/A -3.08 -3.69
NGMT 922 9.31 N/A -24.39 -4.48 3.69 N/A 0.61
OA 92.4 5.62 N/A -28.08 -8.17 0.60 N/A -3.08 -3.45
NGMT 92.4 9.07 N/A -24.63 -4.72 405 N/A 0.37
OA 932 3.90 N/A -42.13 -26.66 N/A N/A -1.12 -8.71
NGMT 932 12.61 N/A -33.42 -17.95 N/A N/A 759
OA 93.4 3.90 N/A -42.13 -26.66 -2.00 N/A -1.12 -9.00
NGMT 93.4 12.90 N/A -33.13 -17.66 7.00 N/A 7.
APPENDIX 7a continued
Comments: Due to the lack of information available, many values of the
ROA for some companies were not available for some data points. However,
the results are still a good indication for the value of the management of each
company for the relevant year of operation.
89
OMPANY YEAR Hoegh OSG OMI Berg Wilh Argon BT Avg
shipp. ROA
OA 892 N/A 3.37 N/A 11.22 3.30 10.39 1.17 4.9
NGMT 892 N/A -154 N/A 6.31 -1.61 5.48 -3.74
OA 89.4 N/A 3.37 N/A 11.22 330 10.39 1.17 12.7
NGMT 89.4 N/A -9.39 N/A -1.54 -9.46 -2.37 -11.59
OA 902 -2.19 3.73 0.89 858 9.07 2.68 297 5
NGMT 90.2 -7.85 -1.93 -4.77 2.92 3.41 -2.98 -2.69
OA 90.4 -2.19 3.73 0.89 8.58 9.07 2.68 297 3
NGMT 90.4 -5.75 0.17 -2.67 5.02 551 -0.88 -059
OA 912 830 3.56 2.45 028 2.44 -10.08 -30.45 -1.5
NGMT 912 9.89 5.15 4.04 1.87 4.03 -8.49 -28.86
OA 91.4 8.30 3.56 2.45 0.28 2.44 -10.08 -30.45 4.
NGMT 91.4 12.58 7.84 6.73 4.56 6.72 -5.80 -26.17
OA 922 4.03 0.00 -4.71 139 -1.22 -2.92 -350 -3.6
NGMT 922 7.72 3.69 -1.02 5.08 2.47 0.77 0.19
OA 92.4 4.03 0.00 -4.71 N/A -1.22 -2.92 -3.50 -3.
NGMT 92.4 7.48 3.45 -1.26 N/A 2.23 0.53 -0.05
OA 932 6.16 0.98 -2.13 N/A N/A N/A N/A -8.71
NGMT 932 14.87 9.69 6.58 N/A N/A N/A N/A
OA 93.4 6.16 0.98 -2.13 N/A N/A N/A N/A -9.
NGMT 93.4 15.16 9.98 6.87 N/A N/A N/A N/A
APPENDIX 7b
Calculation Of The Dry Bulk And Tanker Index Used In The Model
year 89.2 89.4 90.2 90.4 91.2
DRY BULK INDEX 12830 13128.8 11680 9300 11630
TANKER INDEX 14015.50 15886.00 18481.00 16940.00 18440.00
% Handysize of total dry 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
% Panamax of total dry 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
% Cape Size of total dry 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Handy Size, 38,0()0 dwt 89.2 89.4 90.2 90.4 91.2
Spot - USG/Rotterdam - Grain
Spot rate (usd/tonne): 17.7 17.4 14.9 15.4 16.1
Voyage cost (usd/day): 3900 4000 3700 5100 3800
Earnings per day usd/d 11140 10800 9020 8000 9930
One Year Time Charters
TC rate (usd/dwt/m): 7.71 7.69 7.14 5.82 7.04
TC rate (usd/day): 9900 9875 9200 7500 9100
Panamax Size, 65,000 dwt 89.2 89.4 90.2 90.4 91.2
Spot - US Gulf/Japan - Grain
Spot rate (usd/tonne): 25.2 26.5 22.0 23.5 26.3
Voyage cost (usd/day): 5100 5400 4900 6800 5000
Earnings per day usd/d 14500 15200 12200 11500 15400
One Year Time Charters
TC rate (usd/dwt/m): 5.96 5.87 5.08 3.95 5.39
TC rate (usd/day): 13100 12900 11200 8700 11900
Cape Size, 130,000 dwt 89.2 89.4 90.2 90.4 91.2
Spot - HR/RB/Japan - Coal
Spot rate (usd/tonne): 18.4 17.7 15.0 14.2 15.4
Voyage cost (usd/day): 6680 7110 5960 9560 6080
Earnings per day usd/d 24900 23300 19800 14800 20300
One Year Time Charters
TC rate (usd/dwt/m): 3.87 4.14 3.59 2.84 3.44
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TC rate (usd/ctay): 17000 18200 15800 12500 15200
TANKER INDEX 14015.50 15886.00 18481.00 16940.00 18440.00
% of Small tankers of total 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
% of Medium tankers of total 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
% of Large tankers of total 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
% of VLCC's of total 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46
Small Tanker, 35,000 Dwt 89.2 89.4 90.2 90.4 91.2
Spot - Carib/USAC, clean
Spot rate (WS, basis 94): 191 231 196 421 220
Flat Rate (usd/tonne): 3.54 3.54 3.72 3.72 4.29
Voyage costs (usd/day): 3140 3330 3430 4900 3510
Earnings per day usd/day 10560 13240 10330 24740 12000
One Year Time Charters
TC Rate (usd/dwt/m): 9.13 9.72 9.80 10.65 11.41
TC Rate, '80s built usd/d 10800 11500 11600 12600 13500
Medium Tanker, 85,000 D 89.2 89.4 90.2 90.4 91.2
Spot - Carib/USG, crude
Spot rate (WS, basis 94): 117 140 144 140 163
Flat Rate (usd/tonne): 3.94 3.94 4.15 4.15 4.63
Voyage costs (usd/day): 6700 7080 6080 9000 6210
Earnings per day usd/day 13260 16840 18590 14980 21700
One Year Time Charters
TC Rate (usd/dwt/m): 4.94 5.57 6.00 6.25 6.23
TC Rate, '80s built usd/d 14200 16000 17300 18000 18000
Large Tanker, 140,000 89.2 89.4 90.2 90.4 91.2
Spot - Bonny/USG, crude
Spot rate (WS, basis 94): 76 90 90 88 112
Flat Rate (usd/tonne): 8.83 8.83 9.38 9.38 10.76
Voyage costs (usd/day): 5090 5460 5340 9130 5410
Earnings per day usd/day 14610 17940 18210 13890 23700
One Year Time Charters
TC Rate (usd/dwt/m): 3.05 3.37 3.68 3.66 3.58
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TC Rate,'70s built usd/da 14750 16300 17900 17800 17500
VLCC, 270,000 dwt 89.2 89.4 90.2 90.4 91.2
Spot- AG/East, crude
Spot rate (WS, basis 94): 43 79 63 77 82
Flat Rate (usd/tonne): 9.88 9.88 10.70 10.70 11.80
Voyage costs (usd/day): 10000 10720 8720 15090 8840
Earnings per day usd/day 10850 27200 21630 21940 30900
One Year Time Charters
TC Rate (usd/dwt/m): 1.61 1.87 2.34 1.92 2.23
TC Rate,'70s built usd/da 15000 17500 22000 18000 21000
APPENDIX 7b continued
year 91.4 92.2 92.4 93.2 93.4
DRY BULK INDEX 12735 9425 9140 11230 10500
TANKER INDEX 20272.00 14580.00 13082.00 13817.00 14973.00
% Handysize of total 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
% Panamax of total 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
% Cape Size of total d 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Handy Size, 38,000 dw 91.4 92.2 92.4 93.2 93.4
Spot- USG/Rotterdam
Spot rate usd/tonne 14.8 13.2 14.3 17.0 14.6
Voyage cost usd /day 4000 4100 4300 4000 3800
Earnings per day u/d 8600 7100 7900 10500 8600
One Year Time Charte
TC rate (usd/dwt/m): 7.43 6.19 6.35 7.43 6.97
TC rate (usd/day): 9600 8000 8200 9600 9000
Panamax Size, 65,000 91.4 92.2 92.4 93.2 93.4
Spot - US Gulf/Japan
Spot rate usd /tonne 26.6 21.3 22.3 25.9 22.7
Voyage cost usd/day 5300 5400 5700 5300 5000
Eamrnings per day u/d 15400 11100 11600 14800 12600
One Year Time Charte
TC rate (usd/dwt/m): 5.84 4.57 4.16 5.07 4.62
TC rate (usd/day): 12900 10100 9200 11200 1
Cape Size, 130,0(00 dwt 91.4 92.2 92.4 93.2 93.4
Spot- HR/RB/Japan -
Spot rate usd/tonne 15.5 9.7 9.7 12.3 11.9
Voyage cost usd/day 6560 6560 7140 6210 5690
Earnings per day u/d 20000 10100 9500 14900 14700
One Year Time Charte
TC rate (usd/dwt/m): 3.91 2.49 2.38 3.10 2.94
TC rate (usd/day): 17300 11000 10500 13700 13000
TANKER INDEX 20272.00 14580.00 13082.00 13817.00 14973.00
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% of Small tankers of 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
% of Medium tankers 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
% of Large tankers 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
% of VLCC's of total 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46
Small Tanker, 35,000 91.4 92.2 92.4 93.2 93.4
Spot - Carib/USAC, cl
Spot rate WS, basis94 223 161 191 208 257
Flat Rate usd/tonne 4.29 3.74 3.74 3.94 3.94
Voyage costs usd/day 3720 3770 4020 3660 3470
Earnings per day u/d 12000 7600 11000 14600
One Year Time Charte
TC Rate (usd/dwt/m): 10.31 9.30 8.03 9.13 9.80
TC Rate, '80s built u/d 12200 11000 9500 10800 11600
Medium Tan, 85,000 91.4 92.2 92.4 93.2 93.4
Spot - Carib/USG, cru
Spot rate (WS, ba 94): 128 86 110 156 121
Flat Rate usd/tonne 4.63 4.15 4.15 4.40 4.40
Voyage costs usd /day 6630 6690 7180 6450 6040
Earnings per day u/d 15300 8100 11600 20300 14600
One Year Time Charte
TC Rate (usd/dwt/m): 6.58 4.87 4.18 4.51 5.03
TC Rate, '80s built u/d 19000 14000 12000 13000 14500
Large Tank, 140,000 91.4 92.2 92.4 93.2 93.4
Spot - Bonny/USG, cr
Spot rate (WS, ba 94): 85 54 64 73 74
Flat Rate usd/tonne 10.76 8.98 8.98 9.53 9.53
Voyage costs usd/day 5900 5870 6470 5460 4900
Earnings per day u/d 16300 8200 10300 13700 14500
One Year Time Charte
TC Rate (usd/dwt/m): 3.93 2.89 2.58 2.78 2.95
TC Rate, '70s built 19200 14000 12500 13500 14300
VLCC, 270,000 dwt 91.4 92.2 92.4 93.2 93.4
.~~~~~~~ , =m
94
95
Spot - AG/East, crude
Spot rate (WS, ba 94): 63 37 54 45 42
Flat &Rtte usd /tonne 11.80 10.14 10.14 10.80 10.80
Voyage costs usd /day 9660 9600 10600 8910 7970
Earnings per day 21000 8400 15200 12900 12300
One Year Time Ch
TC Rate (usd/dwt/m): 2.60 1.77 1.63 1.66 1.79
TC Rate, '70s built 24500 16500 15200 15500 16800
APPENDIX 7b continued
year 94.2 94.4
DRY BULK INDEX 10540 12500
TANKER INDEX 13644.00 14256.00
% Handysize of total dry fleet 0.45 0.45
% Panamax of total dry fleet 0.25 0.25
% Cape Size of total dry fleet 0.3 0.3
Handy Size, 38,000 dwt 94.2 94.4
Spot - USG/Rotterdam - Grain
Spot rate (usd/tonne): 15.9 18.0
Voyage cost (usd/day): 4200 4200
Earnings per day (usd/day): 9300 11100
One Year Time Charters
TC rate (usd/dwt/m): 7.20 7.66
TC rate (usd/day): 9300 9900
Panamax Size, 65,000 dwt 94.2 94.4
Spot - US Gulf/Japan - Grain
Spot rate (usd/ tonne): 22.1 27.4
Voyage cost (usd/day): 5500 5600
Earnings per day (usd/day): 11700 15700
One Year Time Charters
TC rate (usd/dwt/m): 4.66 5.66
TC rate (usd/day): 10300 12500
Cape Size, 130,000 dwt 94.2 94.4
Spot - HR/RB/Japan - Coal
Spot rate (usd/tonne): 11.9 15.9
Voyage cost (usd/day): 6630 6720
Earnings per day (usd/day): 13800 20600
One Year Time Charters
TC rate (usd/dwt/ m): 2.85 3.71
TC rate (usd/day): 12600 16400
TANKER INDEX 13644.00 14256.00
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% of Small tankers of total tankers 0.19 0.19
(DWT)
% of Medium tankers of total 0.18 0.18
% of Large tankers of total 0.17 0.17
% of VLCC's of total tankers 0.46 0.46
Small Tanker, 35,000 Dwt 94.2 94.4
Spot - Carib/USAC, clean
Spot rate (WS, basis 1994): 212 226
Flat Rate (usd/tonne): 3.71 3.71
Voyage costs (usd/day): 3860 3920
Earnings per day (usd/day): 11100 12000
One Year Time Charters
TC Rate (usd/dwt/m): 10.14 10.40
TC Rate, '80s built (usd/day): 12000 12300
Medium Tanker, 85,000 Dwt 94.2 94.4
Spot - Carib/USG, crude
Spot rate (WS, basis 1994): 113 120
Flat tate (usd/tonne): 4.08 4.08
Voyage costs (usd/day): 6820 6910
Earnings per day (usd/day): 12500 13600
One Year Time Charters
TC Rate (Tusd/dwt/m): 4.85 5.02
IC Rate,'80s built (usd/dav): 14000 14500
Large Tanker, 140,000 Dw-vt 94.2 94.4
Spot - Bonny/ USG, crude
Spot rate (WS, basis 1994): 71 74
Flat Rate (usd/tonne): 9.34 9.34
Voyage costs (usd/day): 5880 5950
Earnings per day (usd/day): 12600 13400
One Year Time Charters
TC Rate (usd/dwt/m): 2.79 2.85
TC Rate, '70s built (usd/day): 13600 13900
VLCC, 270,(g) dwt 94.2 94.4
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Spot- AG/East, crude
Spot rate (WS, basis 1994):
Flat Rate (usd/tonne):
Voyage costs (usd/day):
Earnings per day (usd/day):
One Year Time Charters
TC Rate (usd/dwt/m):
TC Rate,'70s built (usd/day):
35
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APPENDIX 7c
The Inputs to the Model
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APPENDIX 7d
The Results of the Regression Analysis
MODEL CONTAINS NO CONSTANT.
Dep var:PRICE N: 31
Squared multiple R: .944
Multiple R: .972 Squared multiple R: .944
Adjusted squared multiple R:.930 Standard error of estimate: 2.548
Variable Coefficient Std error Std coef Tolerance T P(2 tail)
AGE -0.589 0.151 -0.893 0.0443747 -3.903 0.001
TANKERS 0.097 0.022 0.316 0.4345006 4.325 0.000
MNGT 0.092 0.040 0.163 0.4668242 2.313 0.030
RIRINDEX 12.773 2.175 1.522 0.0345848 5.874 0.000
DIV -0.673 0.328 -0.151 0.4291341 -2.048 0.052
VESSEL 0.149 0.068 0.317 0.1122677 2.206 0.037
LEVER -2.904 1.601 -0.262 0.1110185 -1.814 0.082
Analysis of Variance
Source Sum-of-squares DF Mean-square F-ratio P
Regression 2640.229 7 377.176 58.075 0.000
Residual 155.871 24 6.495
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Chapter 8
The Athens Stock Exchange
8.1) Current State and Development
and Future Prospects
The Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) was small and quite uninteresting
until 1986 when foreign investment was allowed in it for the first time. Since
then, the share price INDEX started rising dramatically as depicted in Figure
8.1.
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It is interesting to note that despite the persisting macroeconomic
imbalances of the Greek economy and the turmoil in the former Yugoslavia a
number of factors gave an impetus to the market and underlined its potential
for substantial growth. Market capitalization at the end of 1993 was Drs.
3,117.0 billion, up from previous year's 2,044.3 billion and transaction volume
for 1993 almost doubled with average daily transactions value reaching 2.5
billion against Drs. 1.3 billion in 1992. The increased market activity was also
reflected in the capital raised through rights issues and initial public offerings
(IPOs) which amounted to 101.0 billion in 1993, a threefold of the total funds
raised in 1992.
The underwriting boom continued well into 1994 when a wave of
companies from virtually all economic sectors succeeded in raising equity
through the ASE. Of the 40 companies slated to get new listings on the ASE
the most interesting were the Greek Telecommunications Company and the
MEGA channel listing. Needless to say that the recent stock listing by
STRINZIS lines was a pioneering step for shipping companies wanting to
raise funds through the stock market, and others are following closely. In fact
DANE, has already gone public successfully and more passenger shipping
companies are ready to follow.
The outlook for the future of the ASE which is keeping on with the
modernization of its operational framework appears promising. There is
continuous improvement of the operational and legislative structure and
economic and structural measures are aiming to further deregulate the
financial sector and facilitate domestic and foreign investment. Sources in the
stock market believe that there is still ample room for more companies to
enter the market since only a quarter of the 200 largest Greek companies have
entered so far. However some stockbrokers believe that the growth of the ASE
is slower than they would have expected but still substantial.
There are many areas of improvement for the ASE which has some
characteristics that should be considered by both native and foreign investors
who think about investing in Greek company stocks. First of all, about 80% of
ASE investors are unsophisticated individuals who turn to their brokers for
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advice and basically invest according to the advice of the latter. As a result,
unlike the U.S. stockmarket, brokerage firms are the major players of the
stock exchange game and to a lesser extent large institutional investors such
as mutual funds and insurance companies. Moreover, since foreign investors
were allowed for the first time to enter that stockmarket in 1986, not much
foreign currency has been invested so far. In fact very few brokerage firms
have a foreign investor department as most of them do foreign private deals
only in special circumstances. It is true that if both foreign sophisticated
individual investors and foreign institutions invested only a minuscule
fraction of their funds in the ASE, the latter would grow substantially and the
Greek economy would be helped tremendously during a time when it needs
it most. Nevertheless, growth is imminent as seen from the dedication of
brokerage firms to attempt to attract foreign investors. Moreover, the fact that
the first Warrant into a basket of Greek blue chip shares was successfully
issued on a private placement basis to sophisticated investors in the
Luxembourg stock exchange is a big improvement for the ASE. This issue is a
sign that the derivative market that has until now been traded only in the
parallel market 19 is starting to grow and become a part of the ASE. However,
there are some characteristics of the ASE and of the way Greeks "do business"
that should not be ignored by potential ASE investors.
First of all, in Greece, unlike the U.S., banks were allowed to own
brokerage firms. As a result the common problem of inside information,
which is present at every stock market is largely augmented at the ASE since
any macroeconomic change like the increase or decrease of the interest rate or
money supply which affects stock prices could be available to a brokerage firm
before it becomes public information. On the other hand, in the U.S.,
brokerage firms are not allowed to commit in any banking activities because
of fear of inside information leakage; consequently every investment firm
obtains information once it is publicly available20.
19 The parallel market is the trading of shares that haven't been legally introduced in a
stockmarket but fulfill the requirements needed for approval. This market was legalized in
Greece in 1988 with law 1806/1988.
20 Since 1989 Banks in the U.S. are allowed to own subsidiaries engaged in
stock brokerage.
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Another peculiarity of the Greek stockmarket is the unorthodox way by
which some investors choose to do business. Because of the illiquidity of the
market and the fact that few investors own large chunks of company stocks, it
is really easy for any of these investors to influence the performance of a stock
at least for a short while. For example, an investor who owns a large
percentage of a company could decide that he wants to spread a rumor that
the company is not doing well. He then tells his broker to sell many if not all
of his shares leading the stock price to go down. When the prices are low
enough he buys the stocks again at a discount and he has instantly made a
profit at the expense of the unsophisticated investor who was influenced by
the psychology of the masses. However, this trend has decreased since the
ASE became computerized and the psychology of the masses does not
influence the performance of stocks any more.
The goal this chapter is to determine if there is a promising enough
future for the ASE to accept the offerings of merchant shipping companies.
The feasibility of such a listing is assessed by examining the current status of
the legal system of the ASE as it affects the shipping industry and by trying to
implement the results of the model developed in Chapter 7 and comments of
all previous chapters to that matter.
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8.2) The Legal Framework of the
Athens Stock Exchange in relation
to the Shipping Industry.
It is well known that the merchant shipping industry is of vital
importance to Greeks and acts like a "life vest" to the economy since it is the
major employer and the major source of foreign exchange of the country.
However, it is a sector missing from the Athens Stock Exchange but probably
not for very long for reasons to be discussed in this and the following section.
Even though there had always been discussions about shipping
companies raising equity through the ASE and the subject is by no means
new, the legal framework of the ASE had never allowed it until now. The
Athens Stock Exchange Council had always thought that the best way to
protect the investors was simply by not allowing such a risky industry as the
shipping industry to raise funds through the ASE at all (article 7 of the Law
959/1979). In 1990, the law was modified and with article 55 of the Law
1892/1990 it was possible for shipping companies to become public if only they
fulfilled the requirements stated for any limited liability company and after
the approval by the Committee of Money Market of the Greek Ministry of
Finance. Moreover, more specific terms would be determined by law after the
proposals of the Ministers of Finance and Mercantile Marine. In fact, the
specific rules for shipping companies would be made when the first shipping
company would apply for a listing.
The continuous efforts of coastal shipping companies to enter the ASE
led the council on the 23rd of January, 1992 to decide on additional terms and
conditions for the shipping companies applying for a listing in the ASE . In
particular, the council set the following listing requirements for shipping
companies, conditions 1 to 5 being required by any type of company wanting
to be approved for a listing:
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1. The applicant company must be of limited liability type (Societe
Anonyme) with equity capital of at least DRS. 500 million for a period of two
years before the application for entry.
2. It should have a five year record of satisfactory operating profits.
Newly established firms or firms with a shorter life span may ask for a special
approval from the Capital Market Committee.
3. The applicant company should increase its share capital by at least 25%,
through a public offering.
4. It should issue a prospectus prior to the public offering that has to be
approved by the Stock Exchange Council. Moreover this prospectus should
describe analytically the future use of the fund raised by the stock market.
5. It should hire an underwriter (one or more banks and/or brokerage
firms having a minimum share capital of DRS. 1 billion), who will handle
the issue and buy its shares not absorbed by the public.
6. Shipping companies in particular, in order to enter the ASE, apart from
the above terms and conditions set in the Presidential Decree 350/85, must
have five vessels, two of which must be no more than 20 years old, the
remaining three vessels not to exceed 25 years each. The total capacity of the
vessels should be at least 10,000 dwt.
7. The value of the ships should be determined by the Chamber of
Shipping and by an internationally acclaimed firm of estimators.
8. A Certificate from the appropriate authorities should be provided in
case of sale or purchase in order to inform investors.
9. Permission from the Bank of Greece is essential.
10. The maximum Debt/Equity ratio should be 70/30.
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11. In order to determine the share price, the real net position and the
price according to the real profits of the previous five years should be taken
into account.
12. The P/E ratio for the previous five years should be greater than 8,
taking into account the market conditions.
On the 14th of June, 1994, after the intentions of coastal shipping
companies to enter the ASE were proven, the Council of the ASE decided that
there had to be some changes on those rules for the better protection of the
investor. The changes were the following:
1. The minimum number of vessels was now four instead of five but the
total capacity increased to 20,000 dwt. Moreover the most restrictive
requirement is that those had to be passenger ships excluding merchant
shipping from a public offering for the time being.
2. The value of the ships should be determined by the Chamber of
Shipping or by an internationally acclaimed firm of estimators. Moreover a
second opinion could be asked if the ASE thinks it is necessary.
3. The vessels should be insured according to their value by an
internationally acclaimed insurance company, for example Lloyd's of
London, the Norway market or different markets for dangers of the vessel
and the engine. They also have to be insured by acclaimed P&I clubs for
damage/claims from a third party.
4. The vessels should be followed by a registry that is acclaimed by the
Greek government. It should have the highest ranking class in that registry
for vessels of the same category and must be free of qualifications.
5. In case that the whole administration of the companies' vessels is
given to a shipping administration company, the latter should have a
permanent establishment in Greece.
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6. The certificates acclaiming the value of the vessel, the insurance
contracts, the registry certificates, the copies of the nationality documents and
the certificates of ownership and weight of the vessels should be deposited
together with the application for a listing on the ASE and their date should be
no more than a month earlier than the date of the application.
7. The newly entered companies in the ASE and those already in it
should be limited liability companies of law 2190. These should either be the
shipowning companies themselves or be the holding companies, and their
subsidiary shipowning companies should be limited companies of either law
2190 or law 959. The chartered accountants of the company should inspect the
company as well as their subsidiaries, whatever their form, according to the
appropriate rules of inspection and subject to law 2190 They should also sign
the balance sheets and handle the accounting statements.
8. Every other activity of the company should be included in the
prospectus.
9. If one of the above requirements except those mentioned in paragraph
1 ceased to exist after the listing, this would be adequate to suspend the
negotiations of the stock of that company in the ASE.
Besides these requirements, the following issues important for a listing
were emphasized:
1. The age of the vessels and their rebuilding is substantial for their
value, their viability and for the prospects of the company.
2. The compliance with not only the required security regulations in a
federal and national level, but also with the future scheduled rules is a sign
that will be taken into consideration when determining the asset value of the
company.
3. The quality and the history of management is going to be a
deterministic fact.
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4. The condition of the relevant market at the time of the offering have
to be appropriate .
5. The distribution of the domestic and foreign income should be
considered.
6. The fact that the fixed investments on the vessels of shipping
companies are negotiable and liquid in the international market as exchange
currency is important.
It is well known that the Athens Stock Exchange is still at its infancy
and in the process of "growing up", establishing rules and regulations as it
grows. The requirements for any company that wants to become a part of the
ASE are very vague and the major requirement is the approval of the Stock
Exchange Council. In fact, there are no set rules for anything and existing ones
could be changed instantly if the Stock Exchange Council decides that this is
better for the future of the ASE. Consequently, each potentially listed
company is going to be examined individually by the Council and be
approved or rejected depending mostly on the Council and to a lesser extent
on the preset rules and regulations. The Athens Stock Exchange is a place
where "rules are made to be broken", a statement that could have positive as
well as negative implications.
The reason why the application approval process is so company specific
is because the Stock Exchange Council has the obligation to protect the
investors due to the primitive state of the ASE. As it was mentioned earlier,
both investors and promoters of funds of the ASE run their business in a very
unorthodox way. And since the majority of the ASE investors are not
experienced at all, the Stock Exchange Council has an obligation to protect
these speculative investors by not allowing companies using such
unorthodox ways to enter the ASE.
It turns out that the reason why merchant shipping companies are not
allowed yet to be listed in the ASE is not that the Stock Exchange Council has
firmly disapproved a listing but because no merchant shipping company has
actually gone through the process of preparing a prospectus and applying for a
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listing. Nevertheless, there have been many discussions between shipowners
and bankers but neither party has taken the first step and gone beyond these
discussions, although the first party to do so will probably have an advantage
provided it is reasonably priced. This point is examined in more detail in the
following section.
Finally it should be mentioned that some shipowners have found an
alternate way to finance the purchase of vessels from the ASE. Mr.
Panagopoulos, for example, financed the purchase of passenger vessels
through ATTICA, a company that is basically unrelated to shipping before the
requirements for the listing of passenger shipping companies had been set by
the Stock Exchange Council. Also Cosmos, a limited liability industrial,
commercial, and textile company raised additional capital to finance cargo
vessels for the transportation needs of the company. However, there were
restrictions involved with the shipping part of that company such as that the
company should not use more than 7.5 percent of its equity for the purchase
of vessels and the shipping part of the company will not be above 10 percent
of the total business of the aggregate company21. Needless to say that 51.9% of
Cosmos Ltd. shares are owned by Globe, a well known shipping company run
by Mr. Dimitris Hatzis and Mr. Kyriakopoulos the help of whom is
appreciated in the writing of this thesis.
The decision of Cosmos to basically finance its shipping needs using
the backup of a well established non-shipping related entity brings up the
question of whether there is a better way to finance shipping through public
offerings than the direct listing of a shipping company in the Stock Exchange.
It could be the case that investors would desire the insurance of a diversified
integrated group. For example a group that engages in various activities such
as oil trading and storage, international trading, bunkering, shipping etc.,
could be more attractive to investors than a public shipping company with all
the risk it entails. Such a group would diversify the risk for its investors who
would be less fearful of the cyclicality of the shipping industry. However,
there is a legal implication on the possibility of the ASE accepting such an
issue because of the problem with the shipping part of such a company. Yet,
21 Informative bulletin for the additional raise of capital for Cosmos Ltd., April-May 1994.
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the listing of such a company could help find other sources of capital for
shipping in case bank loans and pocket money are not enough.
To conclude, as it can be deduced from this chapter, the legal
framework of the ASE is not explicit and laws are made on an industry
specific basis. In fact anything is allowed as long as the Stock Exchange
Council approves it. Therefore the possible approval of a merchant shipping
company listing is not out of the question. But a necessary step before the
approval of a listing is an application by a shipping company. The shipping
community awaits for the first merchant shipping company which will find
an underwriter that would agree to share the risk with the company and
apply for a listing in the ASE.
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8.3) The Athens Stock Exchange and
the Shipping Industry
Most Greek shipowners have avoided the stockmarkets because they
are satisfied with the "cozy" relationship that they have with their bankers
and see no reason why they should enter foreign grounds and be subject to a
costly failure. Besides, most Piraeus based bankers admitted that they
generally give better loan terms to Greek shipowners than they or any other
bank would give to foreign owners. Moreover, most Greek shipowners are
asset players, i.e. they make most of their profits by the correct timing of the
sale and purchase of vessels and do not have a typical public entity company
structure where profits come mostly from the operation of the vessels. As a
result, most Piraeus based well established shipping firms, have no incentive
to try stockmarket financing unless they cannot get good bank loans because
of personal reasons.
As discussed throughout this work, the limited life funds were created
for the risk taker type of investor who wants to gain from capital appreciation
of the assets. However, the liquidity of these funds was guaranteed since they
included the limited life provision and other provisions like paying all gains
as dividends and not allowing for reinvestment. But if an ongoing shipping
entity that specializes in asset play decided to get a listing in a stock market,
investors, being concerned about their liquidity options, would interfere with
the management and its decisions on sales and purchases of vessels.
Investors would not agree to stay passive and would become a burden to the
management Even though the good management track record of the asset
player type shipowners is a good indication for the future good performance
of such companies, institutional investors would prefer not to be passive at
all. This attitude is perfectly understandable in the U.S. where investors are
not familiar with the shipping industry which is not a part of their everyday
work experience. In fact, the unfamiliarity of investors with that industry
and the resulting lack of analysis is the reason why there is such low liquidity
of shipping stocks in the U.S. stockmarket. But, were those companies listed
in Greece, things would probably be different.
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It is well known that even though Greece is a tiny little country, it has
always been one of the major shipping powers of the world owning fleets that
exceeded in number those of superpowers like the U.S.A., Japan and the
former U.S.S.R. Consequently, the shipping industry is a major employer in
Greece and is a part of the everyday vocabulary of most Greek families. There
are very few Greeks who haven't had a relative who was involved with this
industry. And the ability, lifestyle and richness of many Greek shipowners is
envied by most Greeks. As a result, it has been the lifetime dream of many
Greeks to become shipowners themselves and become the new Onassis or
Latsis2 2 . But unfortunately for such entrepreneurs market conditions have
changed a lot.
To become a shipowner nowadays is not as easy as it used to be. The
increasing environmental regulations and the importance of replacing older
tonnage has lead to huge capital requirements for starting a shipping
company. The alternatives would be either to form a partnership with other
investors with whom they would share the costs or invest in shipping stocks
in the stockmarket and become a small part of a shipping company. There are
many problems associated with the first alternative such as the probable
disputes that would arise from such a partnership. However, the second case
is the most feasible way to own part of a shipping company.
The preceding discussion suggests that Greeks would mostly buy
shipping stocks to fulfill a dream they've always had without looking at the
possible returns on their investment and without even doing any analysis.
Rational or not, this a valid argument and this point should not be ignored by
those shipowners being afraid to take the first step and consider a listing in
the ASE. On the other hand, the irrationality of ASE investor is the main
reason why the Stock Exchange Council is so strict with applying companies.
So, the main problem for shipowners is obtaining the approval of the listing
as the existence of small individual investors is almost guaranteed. Such
22 Onassis and Latsis were famous and successful Greek shipowners.
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investors would buy those stocks even if no substantial underpricing23 is
done. However, this argument hold only for the success of an IPO and not for
the future good performance of those shipping stocks. In fact, it is most
probable, that the same unsophisticated individual investors who would
rush to buy these shares, will also rush to sell them as soon as the shipping
cycle starts to descend toward a recession. However, before obtaining the
approval of the Council there is a necessary and perhaps sufficient step that
shipowners should take, namely, to find an underwriter for their issue.
In Greece, only brokerage firms that have a minimum share capital of 1
billion Drs. are allowed to become underwriters. And there are only three
brokerage firms that fulfill this requirement because they are subsidiaries of
banks. These are the National, the Commercial and the International
brokerage firms. Moreover, convincing a foreign investment bank to
underwrite an issue in Athens is even harder than changing the law.
Therefore, the underwriting in Greece is done mostly by banks and the notion
of investment banks is not pertinent to the ASE. As a result, if an owner
considers a listing, he would have to find a bank that would underwrite the
issue. There are many reasons why finding a bank to do the underwriting of
a shipping related listing would trigger the success of an IPO.
First of all, in Greece, unlike in the U.S., underwriters cannot act on a
best effort basis24. Therefore, the underwriter of an issue would have to act in
an all or none basis, i.e. to buy all the shares of the issuing company at a
discount and then sell them to investors. If a bank which has been lending
money to a shipowner for many years believes in his good management
abilities and decides to take that risk, then investors have a strong incentive
to believe that the deal is rational without even doing any analysis. But
would banks rely on such an investor attitude and underwrite an issue if they
are not sure it is correctly priced and valued? The answer lies on the bankers
and their conservatism. In the worst case scenario, the banks will be stuck
23 To ensure the success of an IPO, listings of new shares are usually offered at a lower price
than their true or estimated value. The risk of not selling the shares of a new listing is
perceived too high to attempt not doing some underpricing.
24 When the best effort basis is used, underwriters can cancel the deal if they are no able to sell
all the shares. In such case, the discount with which they would buy the shares would be lower
because they do not have to incur the high risk of not being able to sell all the shares.
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with equity participation of the shipping company they probably lend money
to. The reason why this is undesirable is explained below.
High equity participation in a merchant shipping company is really
risky for a bank because of possible liability issues. Imagine a bank being part
owner of a tanker shipping company which is responsible for a substantial oil
spill. If lawyers decide the bank is partly responsible for the spill, it could
mean a disaster for that bank. As a result, lawyers themselves have advised
bankers to stay away from such deals and the latter have avoided such listings
and rightfully so. Yet, if the problem of unlimited liability in case of a
catastrophe is solved, banks will probably change their attitude and be less
reserved when deciding whether to underwrite a shipping stock issue or not.
The Certificates of Financial Responsibility (COFR) are probably going to solve
the unlimited liability problem and they have already been received as the
guarantee of limited liability for those who possess them. Therefore, it is
expected that bankers would be less averse to underwriting an issue of a
shipping company whose vessels have COFR.
Nevertheless, if the best effort method was used for underwriting in
the ASE, the shipowners would be risking paying for the costs of an
unsuccessful IPO. In such a case the finding of an underwriter would not
necessarily signal the good valuation of a deal and investors would have to be
more rational in their decisions. But since requiring underwriters to act on
an all or none basis increases the protection of investors, it is quite unlikely
that in the near future the best effort method is going to be used by Greek
banks, and/or brokerage firms for ASE listings.
But a successful IPO does not necessarily imply the stocks will perform
well in the future. What could happen in case a merchant shipping company
gets a listing is, as mentioned earlier, a successful IPO because of the large
number of small unsophisticated individual investors who would want to
buy merchant shipping stocks. And unlike the U.S. stock exchange investors,
these represent about 80 percent of the ASE investors whereas institutional
investors and sophisticated individuals represent the rest. However,
unsophisticated investors usually let their stockbrokers take most of the
investment decisions for them, as a result, if the latter decide these stocks are
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not a good deal, those small investors would definitively be influenced by
their broker's advice. But what do these brokerage firms and what do
institutional investors such as mutual funds and insurance companies think
about the possible success of shipping stocks in the ASE?
In June of 1994, the first passenger shipping company, Strinzis lines,
had a successful IPO in the ASE. DANE followed latter in the year and
MINOAS lines is the next passenger shipping company ready to list its shares.
Even before the success of these offerings, most if not all Greek brokerage
firms began doing analysis on passenger shipping and became exposed to the
peculiarities of the shipping industry. From various interviews with Greek
brokerage firms it was apparent that after their experience with the shipping
sector so far, they would definitely be interested in merchant shipping stocks.
However, the analysts should not forget that the differences between
passenger shipping and merchant shipping are substantial.
First of all, the coastal shipping business is mostly a leisure business
competing for the consumer's disposable income and therefore competes
against other vacation alternatives. Also because the cruise part of passenger
companies is a relatively new concept, it has not yet matured so the business
has continued to attract an increasing number of passengers even during
periods of recession. Accordingly, the stocks of cruise companies are valued
at higher multiples of earnings and cash flow than cyclical industries like
transportation which are more heavily influenced by the growth of the Gross
National Product (G.N.P). But since both merchant and coastal shipping
companies involve ships it might seem that there are a number of
similarities between passenger lines and cargo shipping.
The modern-day coastal shipping is generally covered by the
transportation/shipping specialists within the banking community. Many
legal and business issues are similar to both industries particularly as they
relate to security, valuation, marine surveys, etc. Moreover, like cargo
shipping, the coastal business is very capital intensive with individual cruise
ships costing U.S. 100-300 million to build. And in addition to being capital
intensive, there have been historically limited sources of capital available.
Financing has traditionally been provided by the bank market, supported by
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government O.E.C.D credit in the case of newbuildings. Nevertheless, cargo
shipping is much riskier than passenger shipping and the approval of coastal
shipping companies in the ASE was a necessary step before cargo shipping
companies can follow.
After their experience with Strinzis Lines, many Greek brokerage firms
stated that they would definitely be interested in merchant shipping stocks.
But since most of them have not really done any analysis on the merchant
shipping industry, they would probably change their mind and avoid such
stocks even though they currently believe they could be used for
diversification purposes in their portfolios. The same argument was given by
mutual fund companies which believe that the shipping sector is missing
from their portfolios. The latter were really optimistic about the need of cargo
shipping stocks in their portfolio and stated that they would consider buying
part of a reasonably priced issue only for diversification purposes. This
argument suggests that the first merchant shipping company getting a listing
would have an advantage over the rest because mutual funds would want to
include merchant shipping stocks in their portfolios for diversification
purposes. Even though institutional investors represent only about 20
percent of the typical ASE investor, it is still a substantial amount that should
not be ignored.
Fortunately for analysts and brokers, the experience of shipping
companies with the world stockmarkets so far has produced extremely
valuable and inexpensive material about the shipping sector that could not be
found easily five years ago. Companies annual reports give plenty of
information about the shipping sector and the performance of those stocks as
seen from the model in Chapter 7 suggests that there are ways to protect the
unsophisticated investors. As it has been discussed throughout this work,
most of the areas where shipping stock promoters could take advantage of
investors have been identified and most of them can be avoided by a
prospectus that includes provisions in case those methods are used.
Moreover, the importance of some shipping company characteristics for the
performance of the price of shipping stocks have been identified. The
management track record, the average age of the vessels and the promoters'
equity participation in the offering are the most important ones. Therefore,
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the argument used by the Stock Exchange council that there are no ways to
protect the investors is not valid anymore. Plenty of shipping data as well as
experience exists regarding the performance of such stocks in foreign stock
markets. But there are still valid arguments against the approval of merchant
shipping stock listings in the ASE.
First of all, because of the capital intensity of the industry, even a
couple of merchant shipping stock listings would comprise an extremely large
portion of the ASE. As I mentioned in Section 8.1, the total Market
Capitalization of the ASE in 1993 was 3,117 billion Drs., around 12,468 million
dollars. If only two shipping companies want to raise around $50 million2 5
each, a typical to small amount for a merchant shipping company, they would
compose 0.8 percent of the total capitalization of the ASE. Therefore, the
biggest fear of all parties involved with the ASE is that there is a probability
that a merchant shipping company listing will jeopardize the future of the
stockmarket as well as the future of any brokerage firm. On the other hand
the success of such a sector in the ASE could help it increase drastically
attracting more foreign investors than it could have ever hoped for.
As discussed in Section 8.1, there are very few Greek brokerage firms
which deal with foreign investors. Many brokers mentioned that they do not
have a foreign investor department but they would do some private deals if
there were foreign investors interested in some Greek stocks. But given the
fact that only a minuscule portion of the typically invested amounts by large
foreign sophisticated individual investors and large foreign institutions is on
the level of millions of dollars, the Stock Exchange Council should consider
relaxing the rules. It should think of how much these funds would help in
accelerating of the growth of the ASE and in attracting much needed foreign
income in the country. This type of foreign investors will be sophisticated
enough not to need protection from the Greek Stock Exchange Council.
As a results of interviews conducted by the authors with stockbrokers it
became clear that the listing of Strinzis lines brought plenty of foreign
25 Because of the high processing fees associated with a listing it is not advisable to attempt to
raise an amount of funds less than this value. Since costs are spread out over the number of
issued shares, the higher the funds raised, the lower the processing fee per share.
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investors to the ASE, particularly from the U.S. This is a very good incentive
for the qualifying and prestigious shipowners who have a good project in
mind to go through the trouble of applying for a listing in the ASE. And why
do shipowners like Angelicousis and Tsakos have to go to the U.S. or Oslo in
order to raise equity? Isn't this a pity both for the Greek economy and the
Greek brokerage firms which have been trying to grow very successfully for
the last few years? Or are these stockbrokers afraid that they would be
overwhelmed by a sudden growth of the ASE?
It is true that if the shipping sector becomes a successful part of the
ASE, large investment banks like Leehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley and
Goldman Sachs will not stand still. They would immediately expand their
business in Greece, becoming a threat to the small stockbroking firms which
will be faced with overwhelming competition. But if this is a reason why the
Stock Exchange Council would not allow a listing then this would be another
proof that politics run the Greek economy and not economics.
However, there is another issue preventing the possible success of a
merchant shipping company's stocks in the ASE, namely, the currency risk.
In merchant shipping all transactions are done in U.S. dollars Therefore, an
adverse fluctuation in exchange rates of drachmas and dollars could be
catastrophic to the investors. Solution to this problem is the use of future
options and swaps. But unfortunately these derivative instruments are not
free. Moreover the derivative market in the ASE is practically nonexistent.
But this a good reason why the derivative market should become a part of the
ASE. For example, a multicurrency option in which the price will be
denominated for a particular interest period, will allow the buyer of a stock to
switch from the original purchase currency, in this case Greek drachmas, to
another currency, in this case U.S. dollars. But maybe this is too much of a
challenge for the ASE. However, costly or not, the currency risk problem is
not unavoidable. For example, this has not been a major problem for the
shipping stocks in the Oslo Stock Exchange.
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With the above in mind, now is a good time for merchant shipping to
enter the ASE. Interest rates in Greece are now26 low enough and are
expected to decrease even further which suggest that the stockmarket activity
is going to increase in the future. Moreover, as most shipping consulting
firms predict, there will be a long awaited shipping boom in the near future.
To conclude, it is the shipowners' bankers' and stockbrokers' decision
that will answer the question of whether the Athens Stock Exchange will
ever play a role in merchant shipping finance. The point of this work is that
the larger industry sector of Greece, i.e. the shipping sector, should be
included in the ASE as long as the companies that desire a listing are qualified
and include all those characteristics of the shipping companies which have
succeeded in the foreign stock exchanges. This will benefit the shipowners,
the bankers, the ASE as well as the Greek economy. To give you a hint as to
the type of a company that is qualified for a listing, Anangel American is a
benchmark case.
26 As of December the 7th of 1994, the Greek Government has decided to reduce the interest rate
of the Commercial Bank of Greece because of the low rates of inflation seen lately in Greece and
other banks are expected to follow this example. In December of 1994 the deposit rate was 18%,
the lending rate 27%, The inflation rate 11% and the real lending rate 16%.
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Conclusion
Even though banks have gained momentum lately in shipping
finance, providing again good deals to shipping firms which are well
established and have a good track record, Capital Markets, are still an
alternative way of financing shipping. The last five years proved that at least
a small part of shipping finance can be accomplished through public listings
and corporate bond offerings. This was a result of the banks being strict with
their deals which caused shipowners to seek alternative methods for their
financing. One of the reasons why shipowners did not stop experimenting
with the Capital Markets was because this was an efficient way to secure
funds.
In addition, there is still a category of shipowners who cannot ensure a
good deal from banks, either because of the low quality of the vessels they
own or because of past servicing difficulties on their loans. These shipowners
might believe that there is no need to replace or renew their fleet because
there is not much difference in the profitability of their vessels to that of
younger ones and/or the downside risk of doing so is too high. By tapping
the Capital Markets shipowners can get better quality vessels without using
their own funds and exposing themselves to high downside risks. Along
with the reduction in downside risk there is also a reduction in financial risk
because shipowners can be offered better deals on their term loans, have
maintenance cost reduced, revenues increased and insurance and other
liability costs reduced. As a result, if the world fleet needs renewal but
shipowners are unwilling to do it using their own cash reserves, the
stockmarket seems to be a good alternative.
Shipping companies may choose different ways to use the Capital
Markets for their shipping finance needs. Public Equity Offerings should be
chosen by companies that need to reduce their financial risk, reduce their
gearing, renew their fleet and do not have cash available or are afraid of the
downside risk of using their own funds to buy younger vessels. Asset player
type of companies should consider startup projects which include the limited
life provision but allow for the change of this provision in case the majority
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of stock owners vote for it. This gives asset player companies the choice of
trying to become high quality tonnage owners with steady earnings if they
want to, but either do not have the funds or do not want to risk using their
own funds. Anangel American is an example of a company that started as an
asset player and succeeded to become a profitable ongoing entity. On the
other hand, companies that focus on operational profits should list their
shares and promise investors steady dividend streams and capital
appreciation of their stock. Companies that manage good quality vessels and
have a good reputation are good candidates for such listings.
Shipping bond offerings should be considered by those companies
which have difficulty security bank loans despite the high quality of their
fleet, need cash flows and longer maturities on their loans, are well
established entities focusing on operational earnings and are not considering
the inflexibility of restructuring a bond offering to be a major problem.
Typically, companies that have a major project in mind and need a large
amount of initial capital are turning to this type of financing. Unfortunately,
there are not many shipping companies that possess the characteristics
needed and can get the high rating needed to issue bonds. Eletson
corporation is one of the few examples of companies that realized that the
bond market was the solution to its financing needs.
Even though private equity placements seem to be a good choice for
well established shipowners, past experience has shown that some startup
privately placed shipping funds have ended in losses for their investors. It is
suggested that such placements should be avoided by investors unless their
promoters agree to a high equity participation in those funds. Only successful
shipowners who are high net worth individuals themselves are able to
contribute large funds to their placements to ensure other investors about the
high expectations of their projects. Therefore, only well established and cash
rich shipping firms should consider this type of financing for their projects.
In case there is no high equity participation by the promoters, there are not
many incentives to managers to run the projects the best way they can.
Nevertheless, there are many advantages for shipowners to use private
placements instead of public offerings since they could avoid filing with the
SEC and paying large underwriting costs.
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Regardless of the choice of private or public equity or bond offering,
there are crucial macroeconomic factors which will determine whether a
public listing, either in the form of a private placement or a public offering, is
going to succeed or not, the timing of the offering being the most important
one. The right time for shipowners to list their companies is when the
shipping cycle is starting to climb if they want their IPO to succeed without
significant underpricing. Moreover, they should ensure that interest rates are
not too high in the country they consider doing the listing. Yet, most stock
market investors are not experienced with the cyclicality of the shipping
industry and are not in a position to predict the right time of a shipping stock
offering. It is the experienced shipowners' responsibility to ensure that
market conditions are right for an offering if they want its success.
Unfortunately for the shipping industry, potential investors of
shipping stocks and bonds, as for example large institutional firms and high
net worth individuals, lacked experience in the shipping industry to accept its
high cyclicality and the consequences of it. Most speculative as well as
dedicated long term investors were not willing to accept the way the industry
works. Or to be more realistic, they had the potential and knowledge to
invest in other industries they were more familiar with. However, as
suggested from Table 4.3, if the shipping stock market had been more active,
i.e. if shipping stocks had been more liquid, large returns could have been
generated by speculative investors even for startup projects. Moreover,
investments in some ongoing shipping entities like Leif H0egh, Bergensen
and Wilh Wilhelmsen had been extremely profitable at times. It is a fact that
there is money to be made in shipping otherwise banks would not be
committed to it for as long as they have been. The problem is that it takes
time to get familiar with the industry but it seems that the recent investor
experience has put them in a position to be able to understand the
peculiarities of the shipping industry. A combination of good shipping
projects in the capital markets and detailed analysis by investors could lead to
more and more shipping companies choosing stock listings and bond
offerings as the way to finance their shipping needs.
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The author's opinion is that in the near future Capital Markets will
gain momentum in shipping finance and both the shipping and the banking
community will see many new public as well as private stock and bond
offerings in the U.S. and Oslo stock exchanges as well as in less active in the
shipping sector exchanges like Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands etc. This
opinion is based on the following facts that affect most parties involved with
shipping finance.
First of all, many have argued that the unlimited liability uncertainty
which has been one of the main reasons why both investors and
underwriters have been avoiding shipping projects, is now resolved at least
for companies holding Certificates of financial Responsibility (COFRs). Such
companies as well their investors are not exposed to the risk of being held
liable in case of a damage such as an oil spill. As a result, the banks or
investment banks underwriting the issues of those companies do not have to
bear the risk of having unlimited liability in case they end up with equity
participation in those issues. Recall that even though equity participation of
the underwriters of an issue was desirable by investors and shipowners, it was
very risky for the underwriters because of the unlimited liability issue.
However, whether COFR are indeed a firm solution to the unlimited liability
problem has been questioned by many. Nevertheless, it is a good start for the
ultimate solution of the liability issue in the shipping industry.
The solution of the unlimited liability issue will also help long-term
investors change their attitude towards shipping stocks since it will make it
easier for them to choose the right projects to invest in. Simply by looking at
the equity participation of the underwriters they will know which deals are
less risky and good for long term investment. Yet, the attitude of the risk
taker type of investors who aim at speculative gains will not change with the
solution of the unlimited liability problem. Such investors will invest in
companies that will probably not have COFR as well as high equity
participation by their underwriters.
However, it is the author's opinion that both long term and short term
investors are now ready to increase their involvement with the shipping
industry since they have by now gained enough experience to be able to accept
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the way the shipping industry works. The involvement of investment banks
with shipping stocks that started in 1987 has allowed them to experience
themselves the cyclicality of the shipping cycle and the way this industry
functions. Investors are now aware that comparison of shipping to other
industries should not be done the traditional way.. They also know what to
expect from shipping stocks as well as how to choose between shipping
company stocks. Still, the major requirement for investors to use the
knowledge they have gained is the existence of correctly priced shipping
stocks in the Capital Markets.
Another reason why the author supports that Capital Markets will
provide large funds for shipping finance in the future is that banks will
probably not be able to provide most of the funds for the current fleet
replacement needs. Even though, as mentioned before, banks have lately
been giving good deals to shipowners, they have a policy of not lending more
than a fraction of the funds needed for the project. However, not all
shipowners are willing or able to provide the rest of the funds. It is the
author's opinion that those funds will come from the stock exchange. And
the reason why these funds will need to be raised is that the increasing
environmental regulations will eventually urge shipowners to renew their
fleet regardless of the difference in profitability and the downside risk of such
an investment.
Regarding the issue of whether the Athens Stock exchange will play a
role in shipping finance, it is the author's opinion that because of the
importance of the shipping industry in Greece, sooner or later the first
merchant shipping company will attempt a listing in that exchange either as a
separate shipping entity or as part of an integrated group engaged in many
activities besides shipping. Whether investors will respond to such an issue
in a positive manner depends on the type of company that will do the
listing. It is the author's opinion that a company possessing all necessary
characteristics for good shipping stock performance, many of which were
described in this work, could satisfy its investors.
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